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The Death of Rules and Standards 
ANTHONY J. CASEY & ANTHONY NIBLETT* 
Scholars have examined the lawmakers’ choice between rules and standards for dec-
ades. This Article, however, explores the possibility of a new form of law that renders 
that choice unnecessary. Advances in technology (such as big data and artificial in-
telligence) will give rise to this new form—the microdirective—which will provide 
the benefits of both rules and standards without the costs of either.  
Lawmakers will be able to use predictive and communication technologies to en-
act complex legislative goals that are translated by machines into a vast catalog of 
simple commands for all possible scenarios. When an individual citizen faces a legal 
choice, the machine will select from the catalog and communicate to that individual 
the precise context-specific command (the microdirective) necessary for compliance. 
In this way, law will be able to adapt to a wide array of situations and direct precise 
citizen behavior without further legislative or judicial action. A microdirective, like 
a rule, provides a clear instruction to a citizen on how to comply with the law. But, 
like a standard, a microdirective is tailored to and adapts to each and every context.  
While predictive technologies such as big data have already introduced a trend 
toward personalized default rules, in this Article we suggest that this is only a small 
part of a larger trend toward context-specific laws that can adapt to any situation. 
As that trend continues, the fundamental cost trade-off between rules and standards 
will disappear, changing the way society structures and thinks about law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world where lawmakers enact a catalog of precisely tailored laws, 
specifying the exact behavior that is permitted in every situation. The lawmakers 
have enough information to anticipate virtually all contingencies, such that laws are 
perfectly calibrated to their purpose—they are neither over- nor underinclusive. Now 
imagine that when a citizen in this world faces a legal decision, she is clearly in-
formed of exactly how to comply with every relevant law before she acts. This citizen 
does not have to weigh the reasonableness of her actions, nor does she have to search 
for the content of a law. She just obeys a simple directive. The laws at work in this 
world are not traditional rules and standards. Instead, they take a new form that cap-
tures the benefits of both rules and standards without incurring the costs. This new 
form—we call it the microdirective—is the future of law. 
When lawmakers enact laws today, they must choose between using rules and 
using standards to achieve a desired goal.1 This choice requires a trade-off between 
certainty and calibration. Rules provide certainty through clear ex ante statements of 
the content of the law.2 But rules are costly to design because lawmakers must, at the 
                                                                                                             
 
 1.  The trade-off occurs on a particular level. Any given law may use rules for some 
components and standards for others. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561 n.6 (1992); see John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s 
Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1027 (2014) (“[I]n the real world, rules and standards rarely 
exist as perfect Platonic forms.”). For demonstrative purposes, we follow convention in 
discussing the rules-standards decision as a binary choice.  
 2.  The literature on this distinction is vast. See WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL 
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 163–71 (2007); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL 
REASON AND NORMS (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 
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outset, identify and analyze all the various scenarios to which rules might apply. 
Rules can also be imprecise and error prone. Because they are defined ahead of time, 
they can be poorly calibrated3 to the events as they actually occur.4 
Standards, on the other hand, are adjudicated after the fact. As a result, lawmakers 
avoid high up-front design costs. Moreover, when applied after the fact, standards 
can be precisely tailored or calibrated to a specific context as it actually arose.5 But 
they also generate ex ante uncertainty because regulated actors do not know up front 
whether their behavior will be deemed by the adjudicator to comply with the 
standard.6 
We suggest that technological advances in predictive and communication tech-
nologies will render this trade-off between rules and standards unnecessary. A new 
form of law, the microdirective, will emerge to provide all of the benefits of both 
rules and standards without the costs of either. These microdirectives will provide ex 
ante behavioral prescriptions finely tailored to every possible scenario.  
The first technology to consider is predictive technology. Innovations in big data 
and artificial intelligence will make it increasingly easy to predict the outcomes that 
certain behavior will produce. Lawmakers will ultimately have the ability to cheaply 
gather information and use predictive algorithms and big data to update the law 
                                                                                                             
 
961–62 (1995); see also Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 
Term—Foreward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). See 
generally Kaplow, supra note 1 (explaining the distinction from an economic perspective); 
Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 803, 803 n.1 (2005) (same). 
 3.  We use the term calibration to denote the fit of a law to its legislative purpose. For 
example, a fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit may be poorly calibrated because it is too low 
when the weather is perfect and the roads are clear and too high when the weather is bad and 
the roads are crowded. Another term could be “inclusiveness.” The fifty-five miles-per-hour 
speed limit is both under- and overinclusive because it prohibits some desirable behavior 
(driving sixty miles per hour on a sunny day) and allows some undesirable behavior (driving 
fifty miles per hour on a rainy day). See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65, 73–74 (1983) (exploring the costs of rulemaking and 
defining under- and overinclusiveness); Kaplow, supra note 1, at 565; McGinnis & Wasick, 
supra note 1 at 1030–31; Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 
N.Z. L. REV. 303, 305–09; Schauer, supra note 2, at 803–04; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 992. 
What we call calibration is similar to what Diver calls congruence. Diver, supra, at 67. 
 4.  More formally, in law-and-economics terms, a rule introduces high ex ante decision 
and error costs because it is costly to predict and set rules for every possible scenario. See infra 
Part I.A. 
 5.  This precision is less costly for standards because the adjudicator only has to figure 
out the context-specific applications for cases that actually arise, whereas an ex ante rule has 
to address all possible applications. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 562–63; McGinnis & Wasick, 
supra note 1, at 1031; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1003–04. 
 6.  Kaplow, supra note 1, at 569, 575 n.42, 587–88; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 974–77; 
see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986) (modeling the costs of uncertain standards); Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1689–701 (1976). Our 
comparisons here assume unbiased lawmakers and judges. We discuss bias in Part II. 
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instantly based on all relevant factors.7 In effect, this lowers the cost of designing 
precise, finely calibrated laws.  
The second technology to consider is communication technology. Ubiquitous and 
instantaneous communication capabilities will reduce the uncertainty of law. From 
the vast catalog of rules generated by predictive technology, communication tech-
nology will be able to identify the rules applicable to an actual situation and inform 
the regulated actor exactly how to comply with the law.8 It will be able to translate 
all the information into a single behavioral directive that individuals can easily 
follow.  
To see how the mechanism might work, consider the regulation of traffic speed. 
In a world of rules and standards, a legislature hoping to optimize safety and travel 
time could enact a rule (a sixty miles-per-hour speed limit) or a standard (“drive 
reasonably”). With microdirectives, however, the law looks quite different. The 
legislature merely states its goal. Machines then design the law as a vast catalog of 
context-specific rules to optimize that goal. From this catalog, a specific micro-
directive is selected and communicated to a particular driver (perhaps on a dashboard 
display) as a precise speed for the specific conditions she faces. For example, a 
microdirective might provide a speed limit of 51.2 miles per hour for a particular 
driver with twelve years of experience on a rainy Tuesday at 3:27 p.m. The legisla-
tion remains constant, but the microdirective updates as quickly as conditions 
change.  
In this Article, we explore whether this example could become the model for law 
more broadly. Our long-run prediction is that microdirectives will become the domi-
nant form of law, culminating in the death of rules and standards. But even if that 
full evolution does not happen, microdirectives are certain to become a viable alter-
native for many laws. This short-run phenomenon is of great importance, as even a 
limited spread of microdirectives has the potential to change the way laws are struc-
tured and thought about generally. 
This advent of microdirectives may take various paths. In the simplest story, the 
legislature uses the new technology and communicates the command to the citizen. 
We use this example to illustrate the concept. More realistically, however, the tech-
nology will often be implemented at the administrative level by regulators and en-
forcement agencies. Lawmakers may still enact standards, but administrative agents 
will convert them to microdirectives. A third possibility is that private citizens will 
generate the microdirectives. Citizens using private predictive technology may 
                                                                                                             
 
 7.  The optimal rate of change in law (from the perspective of social welfare or some 
other legislative goal) may be slower. But that optimal rate could be factored in by the 
technology. See infra Part III.B. Courts currently update standards over the span of many years. 
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, The 
Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School 
of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 8.  We define communication function to include two steps. First, there is the 
communication of the context of an actual scenario to the machine. Second, there is the 
communication of the legal directive from the machine to the individual. See infra Part I.B. 
The first step might alternatively be called fact gathering. We lump them together because, in 
practice, the technology facilitating the information flow in each direction is likely to be the 
same or closely related. 
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inform themselves of the most reasonable action in any particular situation. As that 
private technology gets better, two things will happen. First, failure to use the tech-
nology will become a per se violation of a legal standard. And, second, the technol-
ogy will be able to predict judicial outcomes. Both effects will result in citizens using 
private technology to derive a simple microdirective for how to comply with the law.  
For all of these paths, the result is that laws that look like standards to the legisla-
tures will appear as simple and easy-to-follow directives to the regulated individual. 
This form of law is neither a standard nor a rule. It provides the certainty of a rule 
and the calibration of a standard, with none of the decision costs associated with 
either. Moreover, the law, in application, morphs from a standard (for the legislature) 
to a set of complex rules (within the machine process) to a simple command (for the 
citizen).  
We describe the rise of microdirectives as the death of rules and standards. One 
might alternatively frame the coming change simply as the death of standards. After 
all, microdirectives are ex ante rules that govern behavior. The driver in our example 
is told exactly how to behave ex ante. In that framing, technology has reduced the 
cost of precise ex ante rule making. Rules will no longer be over- and underinclusive. 
As a result, the rationale for using standards goes away. That is consistent with the 
conventional law-and-economics definition of a rule as having ex ante content (rela-
tive to the regulated actor). But the lawmakers are not enacting rules. The lawmakers 
need not spend the time to prescribe precise rules. They can enact broad standards 
and let the machines do the rest. Indeed, from the perspective of the lawmakers, it is 
the death of rules. The framing is less important than the recognition that micro-
directives will change the foundational nature of law.9  
Our analysis is positive rather than normative. One might think of perfect calibra-
tion of laws to legislative goals as problematic in a system with multiple branches 
and checks and balances. Indeed, our analysis implies a reduced role for judges and 
perhaps the need for institutional reforms to preserve important aspects of our current 
system. Others may view microdirectives as a threat to privacy and autonomy. The 
easier it is for the government to learn information about the behavior of an individ-
ual and use technology to predict outcomes, the more the government can 
micromanage to achieve desired social results. Finally, some may have concerns 
about ethics and moral health in a world where many important decisions are auto-
mated.10 We do not take a side on these normative questions. We do, however, try to 
flag the areas where the thorniest normative questions will arise. 
The primary contribution of this Article is to explore the most far-reaching effects 
                                                                                                             
 
 9.  This question of framing suggests an interesting semantic deficit in the way legal 
academics talk about rules and standards. Readers of our earlier drafts have been equally split 
on what it means to call something a rule. Some infer that the label “rule” denotes an ex ante 
statement of content from the lawmaker. Others infer that it denotes an ex ante instruction for 
the regulated individual. That disconnect does not matter much with traditional lawmaking. 
But as microdirectives proliferate, the tension will come to the forefront. As a result, not only 
do actual rules and standards die, but so too does the meaningful use of those words to label 
the laws that exist. 
 10.  See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional 
Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222, 1244 (2010) (standards provide for ethical 
decision making important to moral health). 
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of technology on the general structure of law. This contribution builds on and con-
nects with two strands in the law-and-technology literature. The first strand looks at 
the effects that predictive technology has on the legal services industry.11 The second 
strand looks at the nature of personalized default rules.12  
We suggest, however, that these strands understate the momentous effect that the 
coming technological revolution will have on law.13 By connecting the growing lit-
erature on technology and the law to the literature on rules and standards, we show 
that the same technology that will bring us automated compliance lawyers and per-
sonalized default rules will also bring us the microdirective.14 And that change in the 
form of law will have broader consequences than retail personalization of law. In-
deed, microdirectives have the potential to bring wholesale institutional changes to 
our entire system of laws and the way we choose to regulate behavior. 
                                                                                                             
 
 11. Some scholars predict the effects of technology on legal services. RICHARD SUSSKIND, 
THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2010); RICHARD 
SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2013) [hereinafter 
SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS]; Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or 
—How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the 
Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 914–15 (2013). Others explore the current trends 
in legal markets and provide guidance for how law schools should respond to these trends. 
William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461 (2013); Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1169 (2011); 
see also William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 5 
(2013) (exploring the changing trends in markets for legal services); Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Death of Big Law, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 749 (predicting the demise of big law firms); Brian 
Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Services, 2015 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1797 (predicting the consequences of technological innovation on the legal 
services industry). 
 12. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Dis-
closure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014). Porat & Strahilevitz provide a theory 
of personalized default rules in a world of big data. We jump off from that point to explore the 
wholesale effects of technological advances on law more generally. See Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (2016); George S. Geis, 
An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1109 
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 13.  The closest work to ours is that of John McGinnis and Steven Wasick. McGinnis & 
Wasick, supra note 1. Though they reach strikingly different conclusions, McGinnis and 
Wasick begin in the same place as we do, asking how technological advances that reduce 
information costs will affect the balance of rules and standards. Focusing primarily on legal 
search technology and the ability to predict judicial outcomes, they predict a world where 
standards and dynamic rules are favored over simple rules. Id. at 1049–50. Building on this 
analysis, we add in the effects of communication technology and machine learning to show 
that standards and rules (simple and dynamic) will no longer be viable forms of law. 
 14.  Porat & Strahilevitz note that the dichotomy of personal and impersonal rules is not 
the same as the dichotomy of rules and standards. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1457–
58. Personalized defaults can be rules or standards. And impersonal defaults also come in both 
forms. Id. Beyond that observation, Porat and Strahilevitz focus their attention on the personal-
impersonal dichotomy. Our analysis suggests, however, that all laws—both personal and 
impersonal—will ultimately gravitate toward microdirectives that transcend the distinction 
between rules and standards. 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out our general theory of micro-
directives and provides demonstrative examples. Part II explores the feasibility of 
the technologies behind microdirectives. Part III discusses implications and broader 
consequences of the rise of microdirectives and the death of rules and standards. A 
final section concludes.  
I. THE EMERGENCE OF MICRODIRECTIVES AND 
THE DECLINE OF RULES AND STANDARDS  
In this Part, we spell out how technology will affect the administration of law and 
the structure of legal content. We outline two types of technology that will lead to a 
dramatic reduction in the cost of calibrating and communicating ex ante legal direc-
tives, thereby eliminating the need to choose between rules and standards. The analy-
sis is presented in three sections. First, we briefly review the distinction between 
rules and standards and outline the cost choices presented by the dichotomy. Second, 
we set out our core theory that technology will fundamentally change those cost 
choices. We provide two examples to demonstrate how predictive and communica-
tion technologies will pave the way for microdirectives that capture the benefits of 
both rules and standards. Third, we discuss how the emergence of microdirectives 
can take place through different branches of lawmaking or can be driven by private 
actors with access to predictive technology. 
A. Background: Rules and Standards 
Rules are precise and ex ante in nature. Rules indicate to an individual whether 
certain behavior will violate or comply with the law. When a rule is enacted, effort 
must be undertaken by lawmakers to give full and precise content to the law before 
the individuals act. Standards, on the other hand, are imprecise when they are en-
acted.15 The exact content of the law comes after an individual acts, as judges and 
other adjudicators determine whether the individual’s specific behavior in a particu-
lar context violates the standard. 
Generally, lawmakers incur both error costs and decision costs when enacting a 
law. Error costs arise when a law is over- or underinclusive; the law allows behavior 
that should be prohibited, or prohibits behavior that should be allowed.16 Errors can 
be reduced as lawmakers exert greater effort to get the law right. But this requires 
information and deliberation. Reducing error costs imposes decision costs on the 
lawmakers. Additionally, regulated individuals face a cost in figuring out whether 
their behavior complies with the law. When the application of the law to a particular 
situation cannot be easily predicted, the individual incurs cost of legal uncertainty. 
Error, decision, and uncertainty costs arise in different ways for rules and stand-
ards. The classic models in the rules-versus-standards literature conclude that, for 
                                                                                                             
 
 15.  Standards are found wherever vague and ambiguous terms such as “reasonable,” 
“material,” or “excessive” are used in the law. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 308–09; Schauer, 
supra note 2, at 804–05. 
 16.  McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, at 1031. 
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several reasons, standards tend to perform better when the behavior of the regulated 
actors is infrequent and heterogeneous.17 
First, when behavior of regulated actors is infrequent, standards generate lower 
decision costs because the content of the law only needs to be decided in the in-
frequent event that the relevant context actually arises. Rules, on the other hand, re-
quire ex ante decisions about all future possible scenarios. Where behavior is in-
frequent and heterogeneous, lawmakers must make many more decisions if they want 
to write rules that are as precise in application as a standard that is adjudicated ex 
post would be. Rules do, however, impose lower decision costs when behavior is 
frequent and homogeneous. Economies of scale kick in and a law need only be en-
acted once rather than litigated over and over again.18 
Second, error costs for standards are lower when behavior is infrequent and het-
erogeneous because the adjudicator determining the content of the law ex post has 
more information than the ex ante lawmaker. The adjudicator has additional context 
not available to the ex ante lawmaker and has the benefit of hindsight in identifying 
which factors are relevant.  
On the other hand, adjudicator competency and bias complicate this simple model 
of error costs.19 Ex post adjudication may suffer from hindsight bias20 and from bi-
ases based on the personal characteristics of particular individuals.21 Such biases can 
manifest themselves in arbitrariness, political favoritism, covert influence, 
inconsistency, and discretionary justice22 even when judges believe they are being 
                                                                                                             
 
 17.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven M. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1665, 1744–45 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
2002).  
 18.  Strict application of the doctrine of precedent also introduces economies of scale for 
standards, but it does so in a way that turns the standard into a rule. See Holmes, supra note 7; 
Anthony Niblett, Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 
310 (2013). 
 19.  See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 2; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); 
see also Kaplow, supra note 1, at 609 (discussing institutional competence generally). 
 20. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013); Christine Jolls, 
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471, 1523–27 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998). 
 21.  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris 
Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 
(2009) (finding evidence of judicial bias based on race); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006) (discussing implicit biases 
that individuals hold against disadvantaged groups).  
 22.  See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 831 (2008) (finding that political preference, race, gender, and other demographic 
characteristics sometimes have effects on judicial judgments); Anthony Niblett, Tracking 
Inconsistent Judicial Behavior, 34 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 9 (2013) (finding that judges in 
California decide unconscionability cases inconsistently with precedent). See generally Jeffrey 
A. Segal, Judicial Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 275 (Robert E. 
Goodin ed., 2011). It has been argued that these flaws of judges may be partially responsible 
for the increased flight to agency regulation over the past twenty to thirty years, in spite of the 
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unbiased.23 
Ex ante lawmakers and regulators may, of course, also be biased.24 But the biases 
exhibited in ex post adjudication are particularly costly. Hindsight bias is more per-
vasive and difficult to minimize for ex post adjudication. Additional biases based on 
personal characteristics of an individual are also more likely for ex post adjudication 
and may be particularly pernicious and harmful to social objectives.25 The presence 
of biased adjudicators, thus, alters the error-cost trade-offs between rules and stand-
ards and weakens any claims that standards have lower error costs.  
A third cost comparison is also relevant when assessing the relative merits of rules 
and standards: the uncertainty cost imposed on the regulated actor in understanding 
whether her behavior complies with the law. Uncertainty about the content of a law 
is greater with standards than with simple rules. When regulated by a simple rule, an 
individual will more likely know whether her behavior is allowed or prohibited.26 
When regulated by a standard, on the other hand, the individual does not know how 
any particular judge with wide discretion will apply the standard to the facts. She 
may not know what behavior a judge will consider reasonable.  
The choice between using a rule or a standard to achieve a particular policy ob-
jective is therefore a question of weighing and trading off these costs. We predict 
that advances in technology will fundamentally change that trade-off. 
                                                                                                             
 
many well-recognized and well-documented flaws of regulators and economic costs of 
regulation. ANDREI SHLEIFER, THE FAILURE OF JUDGES AND THE RISE OF REGULATORS (2012); 
see also Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, An Activity-Generating Theory of 
Regulation, 56 J.L. & ECON 1 (2013) (modeling the choice between ex ante regulation and ex 
post judging where courts commit errors). 
 23.  See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 20; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 970–
71; Rachlinski et al., supra note 21, at 1201–04 (exploring the effects of unconscious or 
implicit biases). 
 24.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1056–58 (2000) (noting the lack of attention to the behavioral biases of 
regulators); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 20–36 (2003) (cataloguing the biases affecting SEC regulators). 
 25.  For our purposes, the important observation will be that machine-created rules are 
less likely to be biased than humans in making rules or applying standards. Our analysis 
suggests that given a legislative goal, machines will more faithfully implement that objective. 
See infra Part II. It is possible, still, that judges are debiasing bad legislative policy (though 
some empirical evidence suggests otherwise). In that case, judges have the power to override 
and influence policy in a way that may be socially beneficial. That power will be lost as 
standards die. We address these issues in Part III. 
 26.  This assumes that judges (and juries) follow rules. They may, however, import 
exceptions that turn rules into standards—or ignore the rules altogether. See Schauer, supra 
note 3, at 312–14. For the most part we bracket the possibility of such rule nullification. But 
it is worth noting that the developments we explore make nullification less likely as well. See 
infra Part III.A (discussing the diminished capacity for judges to influence and change legal 
substance and policy). This is yet another way that law will become more rule based from the 
perspective of the regulated individual.  
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B. Technology Will Facilitate the Emergence of 
Microdirectives as a New Form of Law 
Two types of technology will lead to the death of rules and standards and the rise 
of microdirectives: predictive technology and communication technology. The first 
will facilitate lawmakers’ efforts to craft precise ex ante context-specific rules that 
provide the nuance and specificity traditionally associated with standards. The 
second will allow for the translation of those nuanced and specific laws into simple 
directives that are communicated to the regulated actors in a timely manner.  
Predictive Technology. Predictive technology, driven by ever increasing compu-
tational capacity, will allow lawmakers to sculpt more perfect ex ante laws.27 Com-
putation power is growing at exponential rates. The consistent trend of the last fifty 
years suggests that that power will, by the end of this century, be more than one 
trillion times greater than what it is today.28 With even a fraction of that processing 
power, tomorrow’s computers will be able to gather and analyze more facts than any 
human lawmaker or judge. Lawmakers will be able to direct a machine to analyze a 
massive amount of data instantly to predict which rules can precisely achieve a policy 
objective.  
Relying on the machines to observe and analyze more relevant facts, lawmakers 
will make better predictions about the impact of a law and will face reduced error 
costs. Lawmakers will no longer have to think up rules to enact laws. Judges will no 
longer have to examine citizens’ decisions on a case-by-case basis in order to apply 
laws. And the laws will be highly calibrated to policy objectives with no chance of 
judges introducing bias or incompetence. Of course, the calibration need not be per-
fect, it only needs to be better than the calibration associated with the alternatives of 
legislated rules and adjudicated standards. 
As a practical matter, the result will be a new hybrid form of law that is both rule 
and standard. The lawmaker can set a broad objective, which might look like a stand-
ard. But the predictive technology will take the standard and engineer a vast catalog 
of context-specific rules for every scenario. But that is only the first half of the 
story.29  
                                                                                                             
 
 27.  In a different context, Professor Michael Abramowicz identified the power of 
predictive decision making to “take[] advantage of the best of both the world of standards and 
the world of rules.” Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 74 
(2006). Our analysis is consistent with and builds on Abramowicz’s important insight. When 
the power of prediction that he identified is harnessed and amplified by technological advances 
and coupled with new communication technologies, the law-making process fundamentally 
changes.  
 28.  See infra Part II.A.2. This estimate is based on a trend known as Moore’s Law. See 
generally Mark Lundstrom, Moore’s Law Forever?, 299 SCIENCE 210, 210 (2003) (explaining 
Moore’s Law and its implications for electronic systems); McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, 
at 1041 (describing Moore’s Law); Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto 
Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS, April 19, 1965, at 114 (setting out the premise of Moore’s law).  
 29.  The discussion of predictive technology here and throughout this Article assumes a 
consequentialist approach to law. For a consequentialist, the content of the law is driven by a 
prediction of the outcome of behavior. For nonconsequentialist theories, the use of the 
technology is slightly different. But the trend toward microdirectives will likely be the same. 
For example, imagine that a lawmaker wants to prohibit certain behavior she deems immoral 
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Communication Technology. In the second half, the communication technology 
will simplify that context-specific catalog of rules into clear microdirectives for the 
regulated individuals. Without that simplification, the catalog of rules would be too 
complex and pose significant compliance challenges. It would be impossible for peo-
ple to learn, remember, and process all of the requirements contained in the catalog. 
But advances in communication technology will produce microdirectives that reduce 
or eliminate those compliance costs and prevent uncertainty costs that might other-
wise arise.  
The mechanism for translation is straightforward. Communication technology 
will gather and transmit information about the scenario in which the individual finds 
herself,30 identify the applicable rule from the vast catalog, and then translate that 
into a simple directive that is communicated back to the individual when she needs 
it. In this way, microdirectives will turn hundreds or thousands of context-specific, 
machine-generated rules into simple directives that are easy to understand and fol-
low. The law controlling a particular scenario may take into account hundreds or 
thousands of factors,31 but the individual will receive a simple command like a red 
or green light. When the output from the predictive technology is translated into a 
microdirective, citizens will be able to act as if they are taking into account more 
relevant factors than are humanly possible.32 
*  *  * 
To summarize, these technologies will combine to do the following. First, they 
                                                                                                             
 
regardless of the consequences of that behavior. She does not want to list out all permutations 
of immorality, so a rule will not work. Instead, she can start with a standard—immoral activity 
is prohibited—and then identify samples of immoral behavior to feed into a machine. The 
machine can then use analytic and pattern recognition technology to determine whether other 
new scenarios would be deemed immoral by the lawmaker. We discuss below a similar process 
of pattern recognition for the question of pornography that a lawmaker knows is pornography 
when she sees it. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 30.  We include this fact-gathering function in our analysis of communication technology 
because the key innovation is the communication of the factual scenario from the specific 
context to the analytic process. The technology facilitating this communication is likely to be 
the same or related to the technology facilitating the communication (in the other direction) of 
the final microdirective from the process to the individual. 
 31.  To the extent that certain factors like race and gender are considered out-of-bounds, 
the machines can be programmed to ignore those factors. Indeed, it is easier for a machine to 
affirmatively ignore a prohibited factor than for a human. 
 32.  These microdirectives share some important characteristics with McGinnis and 
Wasick’s “dynamic rules.” McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, at 1039–45. Both can be very 
precisely calibrated to specific conditions. But McGinnis and Wasick envision that at least the 
algorithm is “fixed by a rule” that must be changed if the “world may change in a way that 
makes another weighting of factors achieve the legislature’s original objectives.” Id. at 1047–
48. We suggest instead that one of the core functions of a microdirective is the ability to learn 
from data and automatically update the weighting of factors the way a judge would update her 
application of a standard. In this way, microdirectives are not rules. They update automatically 
and continuously to account for such changes in the weighting of factors. But unlike standards 
they can be communicated ex ante with certainty. 
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will take a standard-like policy objective, analyze its application in all possible con-
texts, and create a vast catalog of legal rules—each of which is tailored to best 
achieve the objective in a specific scenario. Second, when a regulated actor is in any 
actual scenario, the technologies will search the vast catalog and identify the specific 
rules that are applicable. Third, they will translate those rules into a simple micro-
directive on how the regulated actor can comply with the law. Fourth, they will com-
municate that microdirective to the regulated actor in a timely and efficient manner.  
C. Examples 
To demonstrate the point, we present two stylized examples.  
1. Example 1: Predictive Technology in Medical Diagnosis 
In this subsection, we provide an example that demonstrates how improved pre-
dictive technology—technology that allows lawmakers to better predict the outcomes 
of actions—will foster microdirectives. 
Suppose you are a legislator. You are charged with determining when doctors 
should be liable for performing a risky surgery on a patient. How can you best regu-
late doctors’ behavior? How can you best draft a statute that will help doctors under-
stand when their behavior complies with or violates the law? How many of the spe-
cific details should you include in the statute? How many of these details can be 
postponed until we have more information about how doctors behave in each case? 
One option is to provide doctors with a clear and simple bright-line rule that dic-
tates the circumstances under which surgery should or should not be conducted. This 
simple rule provides great certainty to the doctors and is easily enforced; either a 
doctor complied with the rule or she didn’t. A simple, precise ex ante rule would be 
your preferred method if similar patients frequently present with the same symp-
toms.33 Under these circumstances, a rule would be preferred because the content of 
the law can be established just once, and there are enormous benefits from economies 
of scale. 
But a doctor’s decision to operate on a patient frequently turns on many different 
factors. A “one size fits all” rule here would likely not be optimal. Any simple bright-
line rule you enact will likely be overinclusive and underinclusive compared to an 
optimal decision rule. There will be some patients who receive surgery who do not 
need it (type I errors); there will also be other patients who do not receive surgery 
who do need it (type II errors).  
To overcome these errors, you may try to write a more complex rule. To formulate 
this rule, you may try to think up many different scenarios, where you imagine dif-
ferent types of patients presenting with various symptoms. A complex rule is pre-
ferred if the cost of thinking and writing the rules is very low and the cost of doctors 
understanding and being able to comply with such a complex rule is also low. But it 
is often very costly for legislators to think up and write down all contingencies. 
                                                                                                             
 
 33.  See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 573–77 (discussing the importance of frequency in 
assessing the desirability of rules). 
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Further, the more complex the rule you write, the more difficult it becomes for a 
doctor to follow.34  
Rather than implement a rule, another option you have is to enact a standard and 
evaluate the conduct of a doctor after the decision to operate (or not operate) has been 
made. That is, the decision to hold a doctor liable would be made once all the 
circumstances of the particular case are known.35 For example, the legal standard 
might stipulate that all doctors must take “reasonable care” in determining whether 
to operate on patients. This provides doctors with greater flexibility to decide 
whether or not the patient needs surgery.36 But it also provides an ex post adjudicator 
with the flexibility and discretion to determine what is meant by “reasonable.” 
If a patient suffers harm as a result of a doctor’s decision, then a judge can look 
at all the facts as they actually occurred and make an informed decision as to whether 
the doctor took reasonable care. A standard would be better than a rule if patients 
and symptoms are heterogeneous and the likelihood of two patients with the same 
background and symptoms is very low.  
There are, of course, costs associated with implementing and enforcing a standard. 
First, the cost of deciding each case is not zero. There are decision costs of learning 
the best course of action the doctor should have taken in the circumstances. Second, 
a judge may apply the standard incorrectly, either due to error or to bias. Third—and 
importantly—unlike a clear rule, a vague standard creates a great deal of uncertainty 
for the doctor. A doctor may not know how a judge will decide any given case; fur-
ther, different judges may decide inconsistently. If doctors are risk averse, a vague 
law can chill socially desirable behavior,37 and the uncertainty may generate consid-
erable expense in the form of compliance costs.  
But in our hypothetical situation, let’s suppose that a standard is optimal. Let’s 
assume that the question of surgery rarely arises and that patients are highly diverse, 
both in terms of health backgrounds and in terms of the symptoms they present. For-
mulating detailed rules that cover all those situations and being able to communicate 
these complex rules to doctors would be difficult, and a simple rule would create 
high error costs. Case-by-case adjudication is not costless but it is preferred in our 
example because the infrequent cost of determining the content of the law ex post is 
                                                                                                             
 
 34.  Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 150, 151 (1995) (modeling the trade-off between complexity and regulated actors’ ability 
to comply); see also Diver, supra note 3, at 73–74 (noting the trade-off between precision and 
ease of applying and following a law).  
 35.  As Henry Hart and Albert Sacks note: “The wise draftsman . . . asks himself, how 
many of the details of this settlement ought to be postponed to another day, when the decisions 
can be more wisely and efficiently and perhaps more readily made?” HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION 
OF LAW 157 (1958). 
 36. See John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules Versus 
Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 307 (1995). After comparing 
nursing homes in rule-based United States and standard-based Australia, Braithwaite & 
Braithwaite conclude that the flexibility of standards in Australia allows health care 
professionals to respond to their patients’ needs better than professionals merely applying strict 
rules. Id. 
 37.  See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 6, at 298–99 (concluding that uncertainty can 
reduce socially desirable behavior).  
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lower than the costs of trying to specify the law up front in all potential situations, 
many of which will never arise. 
Now let’s examine how technology will eliminate this trade-off between rules and 
standards. Suppose that you learn of the existence of a diagnostic machine that is 
designed to predict when surgery is required. The machine takes into account rele-
vant facts about the patient38—her history, the symptoms, and other relevant infor-
mation—to provide a best guess as to whether the patient requires surgery.  
You, the legislator, have access to this machine. How does this predictive machine 
affect your decision to enact a rule or a standard? The answer turns on two factors. 
First, how good is the machine at accurately predicting outcomes? If the predictive 
technology is very powerful and the machine is able to provide precise and accurate 
information, then this points in favor of using the machine to create a rule, rather 
than relying on a judge to adjudicate a standard. Second, can this information be 
easily communicated to a doctor? That is, can lawmakers provide the doctor with 
timely notice of what behavior will comply with or violate the law?  
Consider two scenarios: 
Scenario 1: A terrible predictor 
In scenario 1, the machine is very poor at predicting when a patient re-
quires surgery. The machine essentially randomizes patients for surgery. 
The machine generates both type I and type II errors. One might think of 
the technology as a simple coin toss: heads for surgery, tails for no 
surgery. 
Scenario 2: A perfect predictor 
In scenario 2, the machine can predict with 100% accuracy whether a 
patient requires surgery or not. The machine instantly examines the pa-
tient’s history and symptoms, analyzes millions of prior cases, and reads 
all articles in medical journals. It then makes a perfect prediction. It is 
better than any human at determining whether it is optimal to have sur-
gery. There are no type I errors: patients who do not need surgery are not 
designated for surgery. There are no type II errors: patients who need 
surgery are designated for surgery. 
Under scenario 1, the technology should have no effect on your decision as a 
regulator to implement a rule or a standard. You should implement a standard and 
determine liability on a case-by-case basis, learning more about doctors’ behavior 
over time.  
Under scenario 2, however, the optimal form of the law will be different. The 
machine’s predictions provide the exact content of the law. The machine provides 
microdirectives for each and every scenario. The over- and underinclusivity associ-
ated with simple rules have disappeared. There are no errors (type I or type II) in this 
scenario. And the costs incurred in thinking up and formulating such a complex rule 
have already been incurred in the development of this machine.39 The justification 
                                                                                                             
 
 38.  In practice, the machine would actually take into account relevant information about 
the doctor as well, such as his track record with surgeries of the relevant type. 
 39. In reality many of the costs for developing the machine may have been incurred by 
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for relying on ex post adjudication of standards—reducing the error costs of rules 
—is gone. Further, we have an added benefit of eliminating uncertainty for the doc-
tors. If they follow the directive of the machine, they know they will not be held 
liable. 
The emergence of microdirectives and the death of rules and standards as we 
know them do not rely on perfect predictive technology. Rather, as the predictive 
technology gets better and better, we move away from the world of scenario 1 and 
towards the world of scenario 2. There will come a point where the technology is 
good enough that the costs of using a microdirective are sufficiently low so that there 
is no longer any need to use traditional rules or standards.  
A caveat is necessary. This tipping point can only be realized if the rules generated 
by the machine can be easily communicated to doctors. That is, the legislator has to 
be able to provide the doctor with a quick and simple answer to the question of 
whether the patient requires surgery.  
Doctors would find it difficult to follow complex, computer-derived rules. Regu-
lated actors have neither the desire nor the time to thumb through thousands of pages 
of legislation and understand complex algorithms. Rather, lawmakers need some 
form of technology to allow a doctor to easily input all the relevant facts about a 
patient and receive an instant output that dictates whether or not the patient requires 
surgery. One might imagine a web-based program or mobile app, where the doctor 
can quickly and easily enter all relevant facts, submit the information, and instantly 
receive a binding ex ante opinion. Such technology is emerging and will be able to 
transform the complex rules generated by machine prediction into a simple directive 
that the doctor can follow.40 The costs to the doctor in understanding the complex 
rule will be dramatically reduced as this technology improves. Even though the rule 
will be highly complex and based on a sophisticated algorithm, from the perspective 
                                                                                                             
 
industry for the nonlegal benefits that the machine brings. In that sense, the marginal costs of 
using it for law are negligible. Moreover, even if the machine had to be developed specifically 
for law, that is a fixed cost that can be averaged across all applications when calculating the 
per rule cost. 
 40.  See, e.g., Robert McMillan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, IBM Crafts a Role for Artificial 
Intelligence in Medicine, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2015, 12:04 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/ibm-crafts-a-role-for-artificial-intelligence-in-medicine-1439265840 [https://perma.cc/DXL7 
-TUWG] (describing IBM’s planned move into artificially intelligent diagnostics for cancer 
and other diseases); Joseph Walker, Can a Smartphone Tell if You’re Depressed?, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 5, 2015, 7:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-a-smartphone-tell-if-youre-depressed 
-1420499238 [https://perma.cc/6AWE-C4AU] (describing tests of a new generation of 
“health-surveillance technologies” that can gather information to diagnose illness and assess 
physical and mental well-being); Ron Winslow, Patients Seeking Alternatives to Statins May 
Undergo Rigorous Vetting, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/patients-seeking-alternatives-to-statins-may-undergo-rigorous-vetting-1438029636 [https:// 
perma.cc/79SD-9EDM] (describing a software application that guides doctors through the 
decision to put patients on nonstatin cholesterol treatment). See generally William M. Grove 
& Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and 
Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Contro-
versy, 2 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 293 (1996) (noting how simple formal algorithms fre-
quently outperform human predictions). 
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of the doctor, the rule will be simple: operate or do not operate.41 We explore com-
munication technology further in our second example. 
2. Example 2: Communication Technology in Traffic Laws 
In this subsection, we highlight the way improved communication technology will 
facilitate microdirectives. Machines can almost instantaneously gather information, 
process it, and produce a useable output that directs how individuals should behave.  
Traffic lights provide an example of this type of technology. They communicate 
the content of a law to drivers at little cost and with great effect. This notice technol-
ogy—combined with technology for predicting traffic patterns and driver behavior 
—creates an environment where lawmakers are able to replace vague standards and 
simplistic rules with crisp and increasingly complex microdirectives.  
Electric traffic lights communicate to drivers precisely when they are required to 
stop and when they may proceed. Traffic lights appear to generate very simple rules: 
if the light is red, you must stop; if the light is green, you may go. But these rules are 
simple only from the perspective of the driver. From the perspective of the lawmak-
ers, the underlying rules are complex. The simplest underlying rule may dictate that 
cars must stop during regular, alternating time intervals. In more complex examples, 
the time intervals can vary by intersection, direction of traffic, or time of day. 
If promulgated without traffic lights, these rules would be far too complex. Driv-
ers would have to consult tables that matched intersections, times, and directions 
with prescribed intervals of stopping. They would also have to consult precise clocks 
to determine when the intervals start and end.  
The traffic light translates complexities into a simple command. From the driver’s 
point of view, the lights provide a directive that is easily understood. And the law-
maker’s cost of giving notice is low.42 Electric traffic lights take advantage of signif-
icant economies of scale that enable lawmakers to make complex rules, translate 
them into simple directives, and deliver notice of the required behavior to many 
drivers.  
Moreover, while the command of the traffic light remains simple, the substance 
of the underlying rules is becoming more complex. Predictive analysis facilitates this 
process. Stopping at a red light when an intersection is deserted is wasteful and 
                                                                                                             
 
 41.  It may seem odd at first that lawmakers are in the business of diagnostic technology. 
But this is no different from what judges do in medical litigation. Judges hear expert testimony 
and decide ex post whether certain behavior was reasonable. In our example, lawmakers just 
use expert technology to do that ex ante. It is true that the role of the doctor has changed 
—diagnostic judgment is less important—but that is the inevitable result of advances in 
diagnostic technology. Our point is simply that in the hands of lawmakers the technology also 
changes the role of law. When the technology is only available to the private actors—the 
doctors in this example—then the evolution of rules into standards takes a slightly different 
path. We discuss this infra Part I.D. 
 42.  These stop-go rules would be far more costly if humans operated traffic lights. 
Indeed, the first gas-powered traffic light used in 1868 in London, United Kingdom, was 
operated by humans. The Man Who Gave Us Traffic Lights, BBC: NOTTINGHAM (last updated 
July 22, 2009, 11:57 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/nottingham/content/articles/2009/07/16 
/john_peake_knight_traffic_lights_feature.shtml [https://perma.cc/4M28-DWR7]. 
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costly.43 That rule is overinclusive. It would be better if the directive to the driver 
could change depending on the circumstances (as it would with a standard). To ad-
dress this, traffic lights in some jurisdictions already contain sensors that detect and 
predictively analyze traffic flow and adjust the timing of red and green lights accord-
ingly.44 Some traffic lights contain detectors allowing emergency service vehicles to 
“preempt” the signal and expedite their journey.45 In the near future, these systems 
will take into account more variables, such as the number of cars, speed of travel, or 
type of intersection. They might even take into account personal characteristics of a 
vehicle’s driver or passengers.46 In the not-so-distant future, a traffic-light system 
may know that a passenger in a regular vehicle requires medical attention and give 
the rushing driver a series of green lights all the way to the hospital. 
The progress of traffic lights shows how lawmakers can define optimal policy 
outcomes (for example, travel times and accident rates) and machines can generate a 
catalog of rules and exceptions to achieve those outcomes. And yet—even while the 
lawmakers enact a standard and the machines generate an increasingly complex cata-
log of rules underpinning the operation of traffic lights—from the perspective of the 
driver, the law will remain constant and straightforward: a simple stop-go directive.  
This phenomenon is not limited to traffic law. The forces at work here are ubiq-
uitous. The invention and mass adoption of Internet technology has facilitated in-
stantaneous and cheap communication between individuals across all domains.47 It 
also, importantly, allows for immediate communication between lawmakers and 
individuals. 
D. The Different Channels Leading to the Death of Rules and Standards 
We have, until now, spoken generally of lawmaking by a legislature. That is by 
no means the only avenue. Microdirectives can emerge through two other channels: 
(1) nonlegislative (regulatory or judicial) law making; and (2) private use of technol-
ogy by regulated actors.48 We discuss each in turn.  
                                                                                                             
 
 43.  There are other potential costs such as the increase in the number of rear end traffic 
accidents caused by cars braking as lights turn yellow. We argue that these costs will also die 
out as the rule becomes more context specific.  
 44.  See, e.g., Ian Lovett, To Fight Gridlock, Los Angeles Synchronizes Every Red Light, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/to-fight-gridlock-los 
-angeles-synchronizes-every-red-light.html [https://perma.cc/SS66-29A7] (describing Los 
Angeles’s $400 million system of synchronized traffic sensors aimed at controlling traffic flow 
and reducing gridlock); see also Diane Cardwell, Copenhagen Lighting the Way to Greener, 
More Efficient Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09 
/business/energy-environment/copenhagen-lighting-the-way-to-greener-more-efficient-cities.html 
[https://perma.cc/3F2D-YS68] (noting Copenhagen’s use of lights and sensors aimed at easing 
mobility and cutting use of fuel as well as achieving more ambitious goals). 
 45.  U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., TRAFFIC SIGNAL PREEMPTION FOR EMERGENCY VEHICLES A 
CROSS-CUTTING STUDY 1-1 (2006), http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/jpodocs/repts_te/14097_files/14097.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9SDF-BRC8] (noting the signal preemption programs in various 
jurisdictions). 
 46.  Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12 (noting the value of personalized laws).  
 47.  See infra Part II. 
 48.  Here, we discuss different channels through which technology will affect the law. In 
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1. The Production of Microdirectives by Nonlegislative Lawmakers 
Legislatures are not the only lawmakers with access to technology. In many cases, 
the lawmaking power is entrusted to a regulator or enforcement agent.49 In other 
cases, judges make law. Those entities can also use technology to create and com-
municate microdirectives to regulated actors. 
Regulatory microdirectives. It is likely to be more politically feasible for regula-
tors to develop microdirectives than legislators. The legislative path to enacting a 
computer algorithm is complicated. Pork barrel and horse-trading amendments to an 
algorithm do not make for successful programming. On the other hand, a regulator 
tasked with enforcing some legislated standard might easily adopt an algorithm-
driven system of microdirectives.50  
The pressures on a budget-constrained regulatory body will push the agency to-
ward adopting technology. Likewise, trends towards cost-benefit analysis and re-
quirements that regulations be shown to be cost justified51 are likely to accelerate 
agency adoption. Predictive technology facilitates such cost-benefit analysis, reduces 
uncertainty costs to the regulated actors, and cuts down on ex post adjudication costs.  
Congress could enact a standard and direct that these standards be administered 
by an algorithm-based system of microdirectives overseen by regulators or the regu-
lators could themselves decide to implement the standard in that manner.52 
Advance tax rulings provide an example of an area for regulators to use micro-
directives.53 As it currently stands, taxpayers may seek clarification of vague stand-
ards in the law by asking the tax authority to examine their tax arrangements and 
determine whether they comply with the code.54 A taxpayer may ask the tax authority 
to give a ruling on a matter that takes into account a number of factors such as: Am 
I a resident of the United States for tax purposes? Or, are my workers independent 
contractors or are they employees?55 
                                                                                                             
 
other work, we have discussed the incremental nature of these changes. See Anthony J. Casey 
& Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429 (2016). 
 49.  From the legislature’s perspective, the delegation to an agency or enforcer takes the 
form of a standard. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 310. The legislature sets a broad goal and 
gives the agency the power to fill the content of rules. 
 50.  McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, at 1042 (discussing the use of algorithms by rule 
makers); cf. id. at 310–12. 
 51.  See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF 
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002) (exploring the rise of cost-benefit analysis in administrative 
agencies). 
 52.  This is not the same as traditional convergence predictions where rules become 
standards or standards become rules. Schauer, supra note 3, at 310–12. With microdirectives, 
laws take a new form that has some of the benefits of rules (more certainty) and some of the 
benefits of standards (better calibration) but fewer of the costs associated with either.  
 53.  See generally CARLO ROMANO, ADVANCE TAX RULING AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
(2002); Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance 
Tax Rulings, 29 VA. TAX. REV. 137, 144–47 (2009) (describing how advance tax rulings reduce 
uncertainty). 
 54.  26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (2017); Givati, supra note 53, at 149–52 (outlining the process 
and implications of obtaining an advance tax ruling). 
 55.  ROMANO, supra note 53, at 80. 
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These advance tax rulings bind the tax authority to the tax arrangements set out 
in the ruling, but only for the one specific taxpayer.56 Essentially the taxpayer is ask-
ing the tax authority to turn an ex post standard into a specific rule that applies solely 
to her circumstances. These advance rulings have a variety of benefits. Most promi-
nently, they provide greater legal certainty to the taxpayer.57 They eliminate the un-
certainty costs of the standard.58 But such rulings can be costly to generate.59 The tax 
authority is essentially engaged in personalized rule making. It is incurring high ex 
ante decision costs by enacting a rule that applies to just one taxpayer.60 
Now imagine the tax authority could create a system where a taxpayer simply 
turns to a machine to answer her tax questions. She could, for example, turn to an 
agency website or a mobile app. She could ask the machine whether her tax arrange-
ments will expose her to liability and the machine could quickly read the entire tax 
code, all relevant cases, all associated regulations, and all relevant advisory opinions. 
The machine could immediately provide an answer to the taxpayer’s question.61  
The tax authority, thus, could use this artificially intelligent machine to provide 
advance tax rulings. Depending on the underlying objective of the legislature, the tax 
authority could use the machine to identify optimal rules that allow it to generate 
more revenue with greater efficiency and fewer distortions on market behavior. It 
could use this technology very broadly to choose very specific rules that are highly 
calibrated to legislative objectives without introducing compliance costs that would 
otherwise be associated with such complexity.  
If regulators adopt these technologies, the answers provided by the tax authority 
would essentially become the red or green lights of tax law. Even though the under-
lying tax laws would be very complex, the directives provided to an individual would 
be simple. Any enforcement agent could adopt technology of this kind.62 As 
                                                                                                             
 
 56.  In the United States, these rulings (“private letter rulings”) are “binding on the IRS if 
the taxpayer fully and accurately described the proposed transaction in the request and carries 
out the transaction as described.” Understanding IRS Guidance—A Brief Primer, IRS (last 
updated July 6, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-Brief-Primer 
[https://perma.cc/RGV3-APFP]; see also 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(1)–(2), (l); Givati, supra note 
53, at 149–50.  
 57.  ROMANO, supra note 53, at 77–78. 
 58.  Givati, supra note 53, at 147. 
 59.  ROMANO, supra note 53, at 277–80. 
 60.  See Givati, supra note 53, at 149. As a formal matter, the rulings only resolve the 
relationship between the tax authority and one specific taxpayer. Further, they have no formal 
precedential effect for future taxpayers. As a practical matter, however, the tax authority is 
required to treat taxpayers consistently and so a de facto precedential value arises—but this 
does not rise to the level of a binding rule for all future cases. Id. at 158–61 (discussing the 
nuances of the precedential value of advance rulings and surveying the legal scholarship on 
the matter). 
 61.  For more on this process, see Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal 
Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 443 (2016); Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, 
Using Machine Learning to Predict Outcomes in Tax Law, 58 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 231 (2016). 
 62.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has a program similar to advance tax 
rulings where it provides “no-action” letters that state that the staff will not recommend 
enforcement actions against the individual or entity seeking guidance. The letter has no 
binding effect on other individuals or entities, and the SEC reserves the right to change its 
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predictive technology makes it easier to automate such regulatory advance rulings 
and ensure their accuracy, they will become a common mechanism for the adoption 
of machine-generated microdirectives.63 
Judicial microdirectives. Aside from the legislator and the regulator, there is, of 
course, a third potential rule maker: the judge. But, as they currently function, judges 
do not quite fit into this model of law making. To be sure, judges could use artificial 
intelligence and big data to apply standards or complex rules.64 But judges are not—
at least in a formal sense—regularly in the business of providing ex ante notice of 
the outcomes of hypothetical scenarios.  
For better or worse, advisory opinions are frowned upon by the American judicial 
system. Judges might use the predictive technology to refine the law ex post. But 
without notice to the regulated actors, those specific rulings impose some of the same 
costs as standards. For example, if judges announce that all negligence cases will be 
decided using a computer algorithm,65 a regulated actor without access to the algo-
rithm would still be faced with nothing more than a standard that imposes uncertainty 
                                                                                                             
 
position. See No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov 
/answers/noaction.htm [https://perma.cc/HP8Q-WCWB] (last updated Sept. 21, 2012). See 
generally Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action 
Letters: Current Problems and Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (1998) 
(describing the no-action letter process).  
 63.  There will be some areas in law where the provision of advance directives is 
problematic. Tax provides a salient example. For some things, the lawmaker and the individual 
have aligned incentives. The individual wants to comply with the lawmaker’s policy objectives 
and certainty makes compliance more likely. But for other things, the individual wants formal 
compliance with law but would prefer to avoid the policy objective. In other words, the 
individual is looking for a loophole. If the law provides a clear rule and the regulated individual 
would prefer to circumvent that rule, then certainty provides a road map for avoidance. See 
David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 882–84 (1999) 
(describing the use of “anti-abuse” standards to deal with rule avoidance).  
In these spaces, it is difficult to predict how microdirectives will fair. On the one hand, the 
use of microdirective technology to craft a precise law may shrink the space for avoidance. 
After all, a perfectly calibrated law will provide no space for avoidance. On the other hand, if 
the law has any imperfection and the regulated individual has superior private technology, she 
may use the technology to find the imperfections and craft her behavior (such as creating 
elaborate tax avoidance mechanisms) to avoid application of the microdirective. These arms 
race scenarios—where avoidance creates private benefits and private technology is in 
competition with the lawmakers’ technology—suggest areas where standards, such as the anti-
abuse standard, will survive to supplement microdirectives. Still, the problem could be solved 
without standards. Revelation of the microdirective could simply be delayed until immediately 
after the regulated individual took action. This prevents evasion but also commits the 
government to the rule ahead of time to avoid bias. On the general idea of delaying the 
revelation of rules to prevent evasion, see Saul Levmore, Double Blind Lawmaking and Other 
Comments on Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 915 (1999). 
 64.  Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1436 (“Under certain circumstances, we 
want the courts (and advocates in the courtroom) to embrace the science of Big Data as a 
means of deciding what terms ought to be imported into an ambiguous contract or will.”). 
 65.  The hypothetical scenario is not as fanciful as it may sound. The algorithm here is 
just a more precise amalgamation of the expert opinions that courts routinely rely on in 
deciding cases. 
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about how the judges will apply that standard. It would make little difference to the 
individual that the actual judge happens to be a computer.66  
Things change if the regulated actors have access to the algorithm that judges will 
use. In that world, the regulated actors can predict the outcome with precision. If 
judges commit to using a certain technology that is available to the public, that would 
be equivalent to providing advance rulings.67 This would essentially shift the judge’s 
role to that of ex ante regulators. While not implausible, we think the avenues of 
legislative and regulatory rulemaking will be more pervasive. 
There is another way that judges could be involved in the promulgation of micro-
directives. Just as legislatures could set a broad policy objective and delegate the rule 
making to an agency, so too could the courts. In deciding cases, courts can announce 
a standard that blesses any rule that results from a process aimed at the correct policy 
objective and that takes into account the relevant factors. The agency could then cre-
ate an algorithm that does exactly that. This “second-order regulation” by the court 
would send a message to the agencies on how to design the algorithm to ensure 
compliance.68 Here again it would be the agencies and enforcers who have the 
ultimate responsibility for implementing the machine algorithm to promulgate 
microdirectives. 
2. An Alternative path: Private Use of Technology by Regulated Actors 
Predictive technology will be available to private actors. And, in some cases, pri-
vate actors may have more advanced proprietary technology than legislatures, regu-
lators, or courts.69 Private use of predictive technology will lead to the emergence of 
microdirectives. There are two main ways this can occur.  
The first path is through the interplay of reasonableness, industry standards, and 
technology. In our medical example above, imagine that the machine that predicts 
medical outcomes is available not to lawmakers but only directly to doctors. As the 
                                                                                                             
 
 66.  It is worth noting that ex post error and inconsistency costs are likely to be lower if 
the judge is using the algorithm. See the example of bail, infra Part II.A.2. 
 67.  In a slightly different but related context, one commentator has suggested that judges 
could bind themselves to textualist interpretations of statutes by using computers to derive the 
meaning of text. Betsy Cooper, Judges in Jeopardy!: Could IBM’s Watson Beat Courts at Their 
Own Game?, 121 YALE L.J. FORUM 87 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/judges-in 
-jeopardy-could-ibms-watson-beat-courts-at-their-own-game [https://perma.cc/8DDC-ZC9L]. 
 68.  See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. 
REV. 205, 214 (2015) (defining a second-order judicial decision as one that “states its 
obligations in terms of ultimate goals that must be achieved. The [agent] is then free to achieve 
those goals in any appropriate way” (quoting STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 
105 (1982))). This can be done for all standards including those that the court applies pursuant 
to the Constitution. See infra Part III. Rappaport’s example of the court’s second-order 
regulation of Fourth Amendment searches, Rappaport, supra, at 220–22, is an area where the 
death of rules and standards will be swift. Machine algorithms will be able to easily determine 
probable cause, exigent circumstances, bias of officers, and the like better than humans. 
 69.  For example, private traders of securities have technology that permits higher 
frequency trading than regulators can observe and monitor in real time. See Eric Budish, Peter 
Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as 
a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1547 (2015). 
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technology becomes more accurate we can expect more and more doctors to use it. 
At some point, it is likely that courts will begin to deem it per se unreasonable to not 
use such advanced technology. Imagine an orthopedic practice today that did not use 
an x-ray machine70 or a colorectal specialist who refused to perform colonoscopies 
in diagnosing colon cancer.71 As technology becomes more accurate and widespread, 
the likelihood that courts will base a reasonableness standard on the use of that tech-
nology increases. The proliferation of these technologies across industries will cause 
behavior that complies with standards to function exactly as if it were complying 
with a microdirective promulgated by the predictive technology. 
The second path is a softer version of our main thesis. This path does not require 
lawmakers to use technology. Individuals can use predictive technology to provide 
predictions on how judges will apply a standard.72 In this way, technology improves 
on the role of lawyers as compliance advisors.73 When lawyers provide compliance 
advice, they are, in part, predicting how ex post adjudicators will apply a standard.74 
As computers can gather and analyze more and more prior cases, they will 
outperform lawyers at this task. On first blush, this advance would appear to reduce 
the compliance cost of standards. But it does so in a way that effectively turns the 
standard into a microdirective, as it reduces the costs of legal uncertainty because it 
tells the individual exactly how to behave. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, a pre-
diction of a judicial outcome is the law.75 
 Advances in big data and artificial intelligence will spawn intelligent machines 
that can predict legal outcomes with great accuracy.76 In our traffic example, imagine 
                                                                                                             
 
 70.  Doctors have frequently been held negligent for failing to order x-rays. See, e.g., 
Rudick v. Prineville Mem’l Hosp., 319 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963) (x-rays would have revealed 
fractured vertebrae); Webb v. Lungstrum, 575 P.2d 22 (Kan. 1978) (x-rays would have 
revealed small metal fragment in wound); Betenbaugh v. Princeton Hosp., 235 A.2d 889 (N.J. 
1967) (negligence found where doctor failed to order x-ray of the injured part of the spine). 
 71.  Doctors who failed to order a colonoscopy have been held negligent. See, e.g., Morse 
v. Davis, 965 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 
 72.  McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, at 1033–39 (discussing the use of technology to 
predict judicial outcomes). 
 73.  See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work Prod-
uct, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1874–81 (2011) (arguing that it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween business and law in corporate practice); Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via 
Business Deregulation: Compliance Professionalism and Legal Professionalism, 6 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 175 (1999) (exploring the role of lawyers as compliance officers); Gregory J. 
Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: Dream Career?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 
2014, 8:13 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579250722114 
538750 [https://perma.cc/E5AW-2Z54] (examining the rise of compliance officers). 
 74.  On the law-and-economics of ex ante legal advice, see Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J.L., ECON. & 
ORG. 306 (1992). See also Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strat-
egy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405 (2000) (discussing the law-and-economics literature of legal culture 
and legal strategy).  
 75.   Holmes, supra note 7, at 461 (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact . . . 
are what I mean by the law.”); see also Abramowicz, supra note 27. 
 76.  See Katz, supra note 11 (exploring the power of big data to predict legal outcomes); 
see also Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1436 (same). 
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that traffic is regulated only with yield signs that impose a reasonableness standard.77 
But in this world, consumer technology has advanced to a stage where it can predict 
when a court will deem yielding to be required under the standard. This private tech-
nology provides a mechanism for informing the driver when she must stop under the 
law. The technology gathers the relevant facts, applies the standard to those facts as 
a judge would, and provides predictive analysis.  
Even though we have standards and private technology, the resulting behavior 
looks as if we had public traffic lights with underlying complex rules. And compli-
ance is as simple for the driver as it would be with a microdirective. The driver simply 
gets a message saying stop. She does not have to even take mental note of the under-
lying facts. As technology makes ex post adjudication more predictable, citizens treat 
a prediction as a rule. They receive directives ex ante and have little uncertainty about 
how the law requires them to behave.  
This may lead lawmakers to simply enact those predictions as law. It is possible, 
though, that lawmakers may deem fully predictable ex post adjudication to be the 
satisfactory equivalent of a microdirectives and not take the final step to formalize 
the microdirectives into law. But from the individual’s perspective the transfor-
mation will be already complete. Drivers will know to stop when the technology in 
their car gives a signal—the equivalent of a red light.78 
II. FEASIBILITY  
In this Part, we examine the feasibility of using technology to generate micro-
directives. This Part is divided in two main sections. First, we examine the feasibility 
of predictive technology. We look at examples where big data and artificial intelli-
gence have been used to generate better predictions and insights than humans ever 
could provide, and we look to where the technology is headed. We look at how such 
predictive technology has dramatically diminished the need for human discretion.  
Second, we examine the feasibility of communication technology. For the most 
part, this technology is already here and steadily improving. Mobile devices are be-
coming our first port of call for information. Individuals can easily and quickly com-
municate with other individuals, and—more importantly for our argument—law-
makers can easily and quickly communicate with regulated actors.  
A. The Feasibility of Predictive Technology 
There are two key takeaways from this section: (1) machines are, in many areas, 
                                                                                                             
 
 77.  See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-904(c) (West 2016) (requiring that a driver at a 
yield sign slow to “a speed reasonable for the existing conditions” and stop “if required for 
safety”); MASS. GEN. LAWS 89 § 9 (LexisNexis 2012) (same); Pierce v. Coltraro, 252 So.2d 
550, 552–53 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (noting the standard that applies at a yield sign). 
 78.  It is possible that judges, knowing about the predictive technology, will (consciously 
or unconsciously) respond by changing their behavior. If that were true, and assuming that 
advanced algorithms could not account for the changes when making predictions, that would 
suggest that technology for predicting judicial outcomes would lag behind other predictive 
technology in effectiveness. This alternative path toward the death of standards would, 
therefore, be less likely than the paths through legislative and regulatory rule making. 
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already better at predicting outcomes and behavior than any human; and (2) this tech-
nology is improving so rapidly that the superiority of machines in predicting out-
comes will continue to grow at an exponential rate.  
Machines can process billions of data points instantly to determine an optimal 
course of action. Even the most competent, objective humans cannot compete with 
algorithms generated by big data and artificial intelligence. We are producing and 
analyzing ever-increasing stores of data that will provide the backbone of predictive 
technology. It may be difficult to envision these longer-term trends, but as Bill Gates 
has noted: “We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years 
and underestimate the change that will occur in the next ten.”79 One can only imagine 
the extent to which we underestimate the change that will occur in the next twenty 
years, or by the end of this century.  
In this section, we first explore how technological developments will improve the 
prediction of human behavior by better understanding and analyzing millions of hy-
pothetical situations. We foreshadow the future growth of cognitive computing, arti-
ficial intelligence, and evolutionary algorithms to show how these powerful new 
technologies will facilitate the emergence of microdirectives. We then look at how 
human discretion is being replaced by computer-based rules in all professions and 
argue that law is no different.  
1. The Power of Predictive Technology 
Big data and artificial intelligence have reached a stage where likely outcomes 
can already be predicted in many aspects of human life.80 By the end of the last cen-
tury, computing machines were able to defeat the best grandmasters in chess.81 A 
decade later, an artificially intelligent machine destroyed the grandmasters of the 
television trivia show Jeopardy!.82 Indeed, machines outperform humans in many 
areas of life.83 They can predict consumers’ taste84 and advise clients on financial 
                                                                                                             
 
 79.  BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 316 (1996). 
 80.  See generally Katz, supra note 11. 
 81.  In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue defeated Garry Kasparov 3½ games to 2½. For 
commentary on and descriptions of the match, see BRUCE PANDOLFINI, KASPAROV AND DEEP 
BLUE: THE HISTORIC CHESS MATCH BETWEEN MAN AND MACHINE (1997). 
 82.  John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html [https://perma 
.cc/CM9S-7CQ4].  
 83.  See MARTIN FORD, THE RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A 
JOBLESS FUTURE (2015). 
 84.  See generally THOMAS W. MILLER, MODELING TECHNIQUES IN PREDICTIVE 
ANALYTICS: BUSINESS PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (2014). As an example, artificially 
intelligent machines can predict wine prices better than wine connoisseurs. See Quants and 
Quaffs, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-
technology/21660405-artificial-intelligence-may-beat-connoisseurship-quants-and-quaffs 
[https://perma.cc/7PCL-X6U9]. Companies such as Amazon, Netflix, and Match.com have all 
used machine learning algorithms to better understand consumers’ tastes. Pedro Domingos, 
Why Businesses Embrace Machine Learning [Excerpt], SCI. AM. (Oct. 29, 2015), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-businesses-embrace-machine-learning-excerpt/ 
[https://perma.cc/U5Y8-FNQG]. 
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opportunities.85 In the field of medicine, computers can analyze images and predict 
the likelihood of cancer.86  
But today’s use of big data and algorithms to predict outcomes is just the begin-
ning. The capacity of computers to process information and collect and store data 
continues to explode.87 The Director of Engineering at Google, Ray Kurzweil, re-
cently noted: “There’s a very smooth exponential increase in the price-performance 
of computing going back to the 1890 census.”88 As economist Professor William 
Nordhaus notes, the increase in computer power over the course of the twentieth 
century was “phenomenal,” 89 improving manual computing power by a factor of 
between 1.7 trillion and 76 trillion times with an explosive trend beginning only after 
the Second World War.90 
The growth in computational power has closely tracked “Moore’s Law” over the 
past fifty years.91 Moore’s Law is the observation that the number of transistors in a 
dense integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years.92 This observation 
has proved remarkably accurate and is now used as a guide to understanding where 
computing will be in the future.93 If the trend continues, then within twenty years, 
computing power will be 1000 times what it is today.94  
That trend will allow computing technology to expand its influence. In the same 
way that city planners have already developed computers that track aggregate traffic 
flows,95 governments will likely be able to collect and use data on how humans 
                                                                                                             
 
 85.  Brad Power, Artificial Intelligence Is Almost Ready for Business, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Mar. 19, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/artificial-intelligence-is-almost-ready-for-business 
[https://perma.cc/ZA2K-57R3]. 
 86.  IBM’s Watson, the same artificially intelligent process that defeated the grandmasters 
of Jeopardy!, has been used in the medical context. Carl Zimmer, Enlisting a Computer To 
Battle Cancers, One by One, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03 
/27/science/enlisting-a-computer-to-battle-cancers-one-by-one.html [https://perma.cc/89VR 
-LSYN].  
 87.  See Martin Hilbert & Priscila Lopez, The World’s Technological Capacity To Store, 
Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 SCIENCE 60 (2011) (estimating the growth of 
computing power and capacity); see also Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443 [https://perma.cc/ZJZ2-8MHN]. 
 88.  Ray Kurzweil on the Price-Performance of Computing, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Aug. 
20, 2013, 1:29 AM), http://www.wsj.com/video/ray-kurzweil-on-the-price-performance-of 
-computing/C1F2B611-4B92-469C-AA33-3129587EC113.html [https://perma.cc/X8DZ-A9FL].  
 89.  William D. Nordhaus, Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing, 67 J. 
ECON. HIST. 128, 128 (2007). 
 90.  Id. at 142–47. 
 91.  See Lundstrom, supra note 28; Moore, supra note 28.  
 92.  Lundstrom, supra note 28, at 210. 
 93.  Indeed, some suggest that Moore’s Law is akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy. E.g., 
Harro van Lente & Arie Rip, Expectations in Technological Developments: An Example of 
Prospective Structures To Be Filled in by Agency, in GETTING NEW TECHNOLOGIES TOGETHER: 
STUDIES IN MAKING SOCIOTECHNICAL ORDER 206 (Cornelis Disco & Barend van der Meulen 
eds., 1998). 
 94.  If this exponential trajectory continues to hold, by the end of this century, computing 
power will be over one trillion times what it is now. 
 95.  See, e.g., Todd Litman, Generated Traffic: Implications for Transport Planning, ITE 
J., Apr. 2001, at 38; see also Thomas Liebig, Nico Piatkowski, Christian Bockermann & 
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behave in almost all aspects of life. But the growth of data collection and analytics 
will not be uniform in all areas of law. The evolution will be fastest where regulated 
actors’ behavior is more frequent and more homogenous. In these situations, 
lawmakers will have more data on how individuals behave. Where behavior is less 
frequent and more heterogeneous, the predictability of behavior will initially be 
weaker.  
In the long run, however, artificially intelligent machines will not be bound by the 
limits currently facing big data.96 Artificially intelligent machines are not simply pro-
grammed with a given structure to anticipate every possible contingency and every 
possible answer. Rather, artificially intelligent machines are trained to predict, infer, 
and intuit behavior and adapt to new and unique situations.97 
Artificially intelligent machines find “hidden” or “deep” connections in un-
structured data to provide stronger predictions.98 In some sense, these machines are 
capable of “learning.”99 They update to take into account whether their best guesses 
are correct or not. In doing so, they amalgamate the wisdom of crowds.100 Artificially 
intelligent machines marshal this wisdom better than traditional statistical techniques 
because the machines craft their own learning rules, rather than relying on a poten-
tially biased structure imposed by humans.101  
2. Predictive Technology Will Displace Human Discretion 
In the near future, more perfect algorithms will begin to displace lawmaker 
                                                                                                             
 
Katharina Morik, Dynamic Route Planning with Real-Time Traffic Predictions, 64 INFO. SYS. 
258 (2017).  
 96.  See, e.g., Daniela Rus, The Robots Are Coming: How Technological Breakthroughs 
Will Transform Everyday Life, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2015, at 2. But see Martin Wolf, Same 
as It Ever Was: Why Techno-Optimists Are Wrong, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2015, at 15 
(providing a skeptical view). 
 97.  See generally STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A 
MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2009). 
 98.  See, e.g., Geoffrey E. Hinton, Simon Osindero & Yee-Whye Teh, A Fast Learning 
Algorithm for Deep Belief Nets, 18 NEURAL COMPUTATION 1527 (2006). 
 99.  Machine-learning algorithms learn by recognizing features, concepts, principles, and 
ideas that humans instinctively recognize but find difficult to program or code. Rather than 
having to structure a program in order to code rules, the rules are crafted and understood by 
the artificially intelligent machine. 
 100.  See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER 
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND 
NATIONS (2004).  
 101.  Bias may affect algorithms that are based on traditional statistical techniques if some 
errors are not observable. If the bias is not corrected, errors can be replicated and reinforced 
by using the algorithm. But recently, a branch of artificial intelligence called evolutionary 
computation has been developed to deal with such problems. Evolutionary algorithms, based 
on techniques used by evolutionary biologists, use elements of trial and error to search for 
globally optimal solutions, rather than simply optimizing with the existing space. Candidate 
solutions are tested using an iterative process. See David B. Fogel, Introduction to 
Evolutionary Computation, in EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 1: BASIC ALGORITHMS AND 
OPERATORS (Thomas Bäck, David B. Fogel & Zbigniew Michalewicz eds., 2000). 
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discretion. While this displacement of human discretion may appear novel in the 
legal sphere, it is simply a manifestation of the Moneyball phenomenon highlighted 
by Michael Lewis.102  
In the book Moneyball, Lewis explores the use of data in major league baseball 
to elucidate the idea that statistics and data, used correctly, are superior to human 
judgment. Scouts and coaches in baseball previously relied on the “look” of the 
player to predict whether a player would make it in the big leagues.103 But they were 
wrong. Their hunches were really just manifestations of years of inherited biases, 
prejudice, and outdated modes of thinking. Taking advantage of this, the Oakland 
A’s used statistical analysis to consistently outperform rivals who had greater finan-
cial resources.104  
The lesson here is that humans and their hunches are unreliable.105 Examples can 
be found everywhere. From bankers assessing loan applicants106 and employers hir-
ing prospective employees107 to commercial pilots flying planes,108 humans increas-
ingly place their trust in machines and discover that outcomes predicted by big data 
are systematically better than human intuition. 
The phenomenon is starting to permeate the field of law. Consider how judges set 
bail. The decision to set bail has historically been based on a standard. The judge 
weighed a number of factors, such as the seriousness of the alleged crime, the likeli-
hood of guilt, whether the defendant had jumped bail before, the defendant’s social 
ties and employment situation, the defendant’s mental condition, and so on.109 The 
                                                                                                             
 
 102.  MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003). 
 103.  Id. at 32. 
 104.  With limited financial resources, the A’s were able to make the playoffs year after 
year by performing detailed statistical analyses of players to build a cost-effective, winning 
team that outperformed other teams with far higher payrolls. LEWIS, supra note 102. 
 105.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 4. 
 106.  Bank managers who must decide whether or not to give a customer a loan have seen 
their discretion dissolve. Banks have turned to predetermined rules about who can borrow and 
how much they can borrow. The human bank manager is left with little discretion. The algo-
rithm outperforms any individual bank manager in determining the viability of a customer. 
 107.  Employers that use statistical analyses when hiring workers make better hiring deci-
sions than humans that make hiring decisions based on a one-hour interview. See, e.g., Chen-
Fu Chien & Li-Fei Chen, Data Mining to Improve Personnel Selection and Enhance Human 
Capital: A Case Study in High-Technology Industry, 34 EXPERT SYS. WITH APPLICATIONS 280 
(2008); Nathan R. Kuncel, David M. Klieger & Deniz S. Ones, In Hiring, Algorithms Beat 
Instinct, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2014, at 32. 
 108.  Commercial airline pilots rely heavily on autopilot technology and are instructed not 
to take control of the airplane under certain circumstances. For example, the 2009 crash of Air 
France 447 into the Atlantic Ocean would have likely been prevented if the copilot did nothing 
and did not touch the controls when the plane encountered turbulence. BUREAU D’ENQUETES 
ET D’ANALYSES POUR LA SECURITE DE L’AVIATION CIVLE, FINAL REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT ON 
1ST JUNE 2009 TO THE AIRBUS A330-203 REGISTERED F-GZCP OPERATED BY AIR FRANCE 
FLIGHT AF447 RIO DE JANEIRO–PARIS (2012), http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601 
.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/WYZ3-PA6H]. 
 109.   See, for example, the standard in Massachusetts where bail is determined by 
examining the alleged crime, the likely penalty, the likely flight risk, history of defaults, family 
in the area, employment status, and previous criminal records, among other criteria. MASS 
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list of potentially relevant factors is almost inexhaustible.110 
But now some jurisdictions are turning to predictive technology to reduce un-
certainty and inconsistency in judges’ decisions, as well as to reduce the time taken 
to set bail.111 Algorithms have been developed that seek to predict when particular 
defendants will likely skip bail.112 The predictive power of this algorithm, which 
takes into account data on the defendant’s characteristics, far exceeds that of any 
individual judge.113  
This output from the data is more systematic and reliable than an individual 
judge’s hunch. The algorithm reduces error costs (it is better at assessing the likeli-
hood of a defendant jumping bail) and decision costs (judges can simply apply the 
algorithm). Judges without the algorithm have less information and cannot process 
the information they do have as efficiently.  
Moreover, judges introduce bias into the system by considering irrelevant factors. 
A well-meaning judge may not even know when she is considering irrelevant factors. 
A machine does not suffer from this problem. Relatedly, machines can be instructed 
to ignore factors that we do not want the law to consider. Thus a machine can be told 
to ignore race, gender, religion and the like even if they are relevant to an outcome 
objective. It is much harder for a judge to affirmatively ignore subconscious impacts 
of such factors.114 
These observations run counter to the idea that there is something “special” and 
“human” about the law and legal reasoning.115 Almost every profession thinks their 
profession is special.116 In the same way that most drivers believe that they are above 
average,117 humans reflexively believe that their judgment and reasoning is special 
                                                                                                             
 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 57 (West 2015). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 
26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science 
.html [https://perma.cc/B267-HDQR]. 
 112.  Id. Algorithms of this type are already in use in twenty-one jurisdictions across the 
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 113.  Recent work has illustrated the value of machine learning in reducing errors in grant-
ing bail. Crime can be reduced by up to 24.8% with no change in jailing rates, or jail popula-
tions can be reduced by 42.0% with no increase in crime rates. Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu 
Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil Mullainathan, Human Decisions and 
Machine Predictions, (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23180, 2017), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23180.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRG3-ZY6W]. 
 114.  For machine algorithms, the instruction to ignore prohibited factors is not perfect. 
Other allowed variables may perfectly correlate with and therefore inadvertently proxy for 
out-of-bounds factors. These are sometimes called “clones.” To the extent a lawmaker wants 
to exclude a factor from calculation, a programmer has to account for the correlation of clone 
variables. 
 115.   See Joseph Raz, Reasoning with Rules, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1 (2001) (asking 
what is special about legal reasoning). 
 116.  See generally MICHAEL A. BISHOP & J. D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 24–53 (2005) (humans instinctively deny or ignore the 
success of such technology because of deep-seated cognitive biases, such as overconfidence 
in our own abilities and judgments). 
 117.  Iain A. McCormick, Frank H. Walkey & Dianne E. Green, Comparative Perceptions 
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and that technology cannot replicate or replace their particular skill. In Moneyball, 
baseball scouts thought that their ability to pick a future major league star would 
outperform any statistical analysis.118 Doctors similarly think that doctors possess 
special skills.119 The same is true of teachers.120 Lawyers too.121 Perhaps more sur-
prisingly, legal scholars accustomed to looking for biases share this skewed we-are-
special belief.  
Legal philosophers often contend that law is necessarily vague and indetermi-
nate.122 Others argue that legal reasoning is different from other types of reasoning.123 
Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, suggests that legal reasoning requires an un-
derstanding of the principles that underpin reasoning by analogy and has been skep-
tical that artificial intelligence will be able to replicate this understanding.124  
Professor Dan Kahan’s 2006 address to the graduating class of Yale Law School 
provides a nice example of the argument that there is something “special” about 
law.125 He contends that in order for lawyers to truly understand and evaluate legal 
reasoning they need years of learning from “grandmasters”126—such as professors 
and senior lawyers—who inculcate students with the power of legal intuition and 
judgment.127  
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 119.  See, e.g., DONALD E. POLKINGHORNE, PRACTICE AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: THE 
CASE FOR A JUDGMENT-BASED PRACTICE OF CARE (2004); Samuel W. Bloom, Structure and 
Ideology in Medical Education: An Analysis of Resistance to Change, 29 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
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 120.  See Françoise Blin & Morag Munro, Why Hasn’t Technology Disrupted Academics’ 
Teaching Practices? Understanding Resistance to Change Through the Lens of Activity 
Theory, 50 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 475 (2008). 
 121.  See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: 
Toward a Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 122.  See, e.g., TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 1 (2000) (“Although not all 
laws are vague, legal systems necessarily include vague laws.”). 
 123.  Lipshaw, supra note 121 (arguing that algorithmic judgment cannot replicate legal 
reasoning).  
 124.  Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 8 U. CHI. LAW SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 29, 32–34 (2001) (suggesting that computer programs do not reason analogically 
the way humans do); see also Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature 
Disruption of Legal Services, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1870 (suggesting that machines 
are limited in their abilities to understand complex law and cannot perform well and “would 
not play nice” where standards are currently the dominant form of law). 
 125.  Dan M. Kahan, Deputy Dean and Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Yale Law 
School Commencement Remarks (May 22, 2006), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi 
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ylsca [https://perma.cc/C9ZA-QB4C].  
 126.  Id.; see also Dan M. Kahan, David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene 
Lucci & Katherine Cheng, “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation 
of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 355 (2016) 
(testing whether judges have a unique “situation sense” expertise based on training and 
experience). 
 127.  Kahan, supra note 125. 
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Professor Kahan compares the profession of lawyers to the profession of chick 
sexers who determine the gender of one-day old chicks. To the untrained eye, there 
is nothing discernibly different about newborn male and female chickens. And yet 
some people with training from a “chick-sexing grandmaster” can examine a chick 
and tell whether it is male or female with ninety-nine percent accuracy. Amazingly, 
no one (not even the chick sexers themselves) can say exactly what these experts are 
looking for. They simply know the difference when they see it. Professor Kahan 
claims that this “special power to intuitively perceive the gender of a newborn chick” 
is analogous to how lawyers determine the difference between “good and bad deci-
sions.”128 Professor Kahan argues that lawyers learn how to reason in a special way, 
and that is what makes the craft of good lawyering so “distinctive” from other 
professions.129  
Within four years of Professor Kahan’s address, the world of chick sexing had 
changed dramatically. Predictive technology had been developed that could accu-
rately determine the gender of a chick before birth.130 Just as the machines defeated 
the grandmasters of chess and Jeopardy!, this new predictive technology bested the 
grandmasters of chick sexing.  
Professor Kahan’s address was not about the effect of technology on law. But the 
fate of chick sexers illustrates a major point: there is nothing so special about indi-
vidual human intuition—at least in practice—that makes it immune to displacement 
by technology. Whether pure (unbiased and unrushed) human intuition is special and 
beyond replication is an unresolved philosophical question. But in application, hu-
man intuition is imperfect and biased. And machine technology can, it turns out, do 
as well as humans even when the individuals themselves cannot adequately describe 
their intuitive process.  
The shortsighted belief that the legal profession is special and that lawyers and 
judges are immune from displacement by technological advances hinges on a bias 
that leads one to believe that only a human can deliver such wise judgments and 
decisions. Yes, lawyers require judgment. Yes, judges require judgment. But, the 
judgment of one human is outweighed by a decision generated by technology that 
takes into account millions of judgments and decisions.131 
To see where this is all going for law, consider how artificially intelligent ma-
chines may turn one of the most classic statements of a standard in U.S. legal doctrine 
into a microdirective. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, Justice Potter Stewart found it very dif-
ficult to precisely pin down what distinguished pornography from nonpornography 
in determining the threshold test of obscenity.132 Instead, he simply wrote: “I know 
it when I see it.”133  
                                                                                                             
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Hey Little Hen, THE ECONOMIST: ONLINE EXTRA (Feb. 9, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/15491505 [https://perma.cc/8BLH-5P3W]. This new 
predictive technology relies on the detection of estrogen in the yolk of an egg. Id. 
 131.  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 100. One might also note that judgment is about making 
the right decision in the absence of full information about outcomes. Once the outcomes are 
known, that sort of judgment is in a sense unnecessary. 
 132.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 133.  Id.  
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Justice Stewart’s view suggests that distinguishing between pornography and 
nonpornography is something that humans can do, but it is difficult to write an ex 
ante rule that clearly defines the line. Justice Stewart preferred to leave the determi-
nation as a standard, to be resolved later. 
Artificially intelligent technology can already recognize and analyze images.134 It 
is not just a judge who can “see it.” In the near future, artificially intelligent machines 
will be able to develop highly complex rules that generate immediate and simple 
predictions of the legality of particular materials (“this image is/is not porno-
graphic”). Just imagine that Justice Stewart identified fifty pornographic images for 
the computer. At that point, the artificial intelligence programs can find deep con-
nections to identify the pattern that is driving the distinction, but that Justice Stewart 
could not articulate. Indeed, such pattern recognition is one of the areas where this 
technology is already way ahead of humans. And it is why the technology is thought 
to be so valuable as a diagnostic tool.  
If such technology were implemented, the law on the books might still look like 
a standard; but an individual could refer to the machine output to get advance micro-
directives and behave as though she were governed by a rule. 
B. The Feasibility of Communication Technology 
Can lawmakers adequately give timely notice of the law to regulated actors? Can 
they provide these individuals with instant notice of how best to comply with the 
law? In the same way that traffic lights let a driver know that she should stop, com-
munication technology can give rise to a world where all laws are reduced to stop-
go directives that are instantly communicated to regulated actors. In this subsection, 
we discuss the types of technology and infrastructure that will facilitate this.  
The costs of communication have been almost obliterated by the Internet. The so-
called Internet of Things135 is an interconnected network of physical objects and de-
vices that are embedded with electronics and sensors to allow products to be con-
trolled and used remotely by the user or manufacturer. Recent estimates suggest that 
between 50 billion to 100 billion objects and devices will be embedded with such 
technology by the year 2020.136 Mobile applications are becoming the first port of 
                                                                                                             
 
 134.   Four Microsoft researchers have developed a visual recognition program that has an 
error rate of 4.94%, less than the 5.1% error rate of a human. Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, 
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call for gathering and processing information.137  
The Internet of Things and mobile applications are not, however, simply ways to 
improve the consumer experience. Lawmakers can use this technology. The Internet 
will facilitate immediate communication between lawmakers, regulators, individu-
als, and corporations. Take, for example, the field of environmental regulation. Regu-
lators could more easily monitor emissions of factories through the Internet of 
Things. Regulators could instantly determine when factories are exceeding their lim-
its and quickly inform firms operating those factories of the violation.  
The example of advance tax rulings above suggests that the IRS will be able to 
provide immediate compliance information to individuals and corporations using 
similar technology to the Internet of Things. Regulated actors could enter infor-
mation into a web-based or mobile application and receive a ruling on a device (like 
a phone) or some wearable technology (like a watch) from the regulator in a timely 
manner.  
Such infrastructure already exists. For example, cardiologists today can simply 
refer to an app, enter in relevant information, and be given the optimal response for 
a patient.138 As technology improves on the fact-gathering front, individuals may not 
even be required to enter much data into the programs; rather, devices will simply 
recognize the contours of the factual situation and give notice of whether the indi-
vidual is complying with the law.  
Indeed, lawmakers could even provide notice of microdirectives when the need 
for it is immediate. Individuals could wear items, such as contact lenses, that instantly 
analyze a situation and give an immediate directive as to the legality of a potential 
action. The military is already experimenting with this type of technology for iden-
tifying combat targets.139 But more mundane uses are also probable: Can you turn 
left at an intersection? Can you cross the street? Can you attempt to board that sub-
way car? And so on. 
The Internet of Things drastically reduces the cost of a lawmaker communicating 
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with regulated actors. But the Internet of Things does not just facilitate communica-
tion. There is a feedback effect. The devices that form part of the Internet of Things 
also collect data on how individuals and corporations behave. Lawmakers can gen-
erate even better predictions of human behavior by harnessing such data.140 In doing 
so, the Internet of Things will further reinforce the feasibility of the predictive 
technology.  
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
 In this Part, we explore some implications and consequences of our predictions. 
If microdirectives become the dominant form of all law, these implications will be 
profound. But even a short-run trend in isolated fields of law will have major impacts 
on the way we think about law. We will focus on the long-run version of our predic-
tion to demonstrate the scope of possible changes.  
We suggest that the microdirectives will emerge as a new form of law that reduces 
the uncertainty costs of standards and the decision and error costs of rules. There are, 
however, other costs that may arise from a world of microdirectives. While the law 
will generate less uncertainty and fewer errors, it may be deficient in other ways. 
Here, we identify four areas where the consequences and potential costs of the emer-
gence of microdirectives may be substantial. First, it will change the broad institu-
tional balance of power in our political and legal system. Second, it may change the 
development and substantive content of legislative policy. Third, it will transform 
the practice and training of law. Fourth, it will have moral and ethical consequences 
for individual citizens, altering their day-to-day decision-making process and chang-
ing their relationship with lawmakers and government. In the remainder of this Part, 
we explore these implications and consequences in general terms. We conclude by 
noting how the existence of these costs may or may not affect our prediction.  
A. The Death of Judging? Institutional Changes to the Legal System 
The death of rules and standards will produce a shift in the balance of our political 
institutions. The proliferation of clear microdirectives largely obviates the need for 
ex post adjudication. This reduced role diminishes the ability of judges to influence 
the law and increases the power of ex ante lawmakers.141 The change in the structure 
of the law does leave some room for some ex post adjudication of evidentiary ques-
tions, but even that will be reduced as the technology for observing facts ex ante 
improves. 
                                                                                                             
 
 140.  Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12 (discussing fact-gathering technology for 
personalized default rules). 
 141.  See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 2, at 261 (“The legislature’s choice whether to enact 
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This is potentially concerning because when judges decide cases they do more 
than simply apply rules or standards. They also have the ability to shift and modify 
the law. This can happen in at least three different ways. First, judges can interpret a 
law (rule or standard) differently than the ex ante lawmakers intended—assuming 
those lawmakers even had an identifiable intent.142 Judges can also choose to ignore 
rules and standards altogether in the guise of interpretation.143 
Second, judges can influence popular and institutional views about policy objec-
tives. Judges can impact popular opinion by highlighting a particular issue in a case, 
using their position to make policy statements, or by issuing incremental holdings 
that generate support for movements that have broader consequences.144 Addition-
ally, given the U.S. federal system, decisions of courts in one jurisdiction might have 
larger social consequences that impact nonjudicial change to policy objectives in 
other jurisdictions.145 Many think that this role of the courts in challenging stale and 
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Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1989); Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. 
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 145.  For example, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that same-sex 
marriage was legal. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Scholars 
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entrenched views has a salutary effect on our democracy.146 
Finally, judges can outright declare policy objectives to be improper or un-
constitutional.147 This judicial review of legislative policy is considered by many to 
be an integral part of our system of checks and balances.148 
These lawmaking roles of judges will change along with the fundamental nature 
of law. Judges will lose much of their oversight and lawmaking power. For non-
constitutional questions, the interpretive role may disappear entirely.149 They will no 
longer have the power to reinterpret or ignore laws. The policy objectives of law will 
be set by the ex ante rule makers (legislative or regulatory). And the judiciary—at 
least if it maintains its current form and structure—will have little or no occasion to 
question or change those policy objectives. The opportunities for statutory interpre-
tation and filling in the gaps in vague standards will dry up as citizens are simply 
instructed to obey simple directives.  
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William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L. J. 1, 38–45 
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 149.  Deciding nonconstitutional questions is the bulk of what judges do. Constitutional 
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Supreme Court of the United States, the percentage of cases has not exceeded fifty percent in 
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The concern here is a separate question than whether machine-aided algorithms 
can implement policy objectives. The question is whether there is an independent 
branch of government with the power to question the policy decisions of the ex ante 
lawmakers. When the lawmakers decide on legislative objectives and parameters for 
the machine algorithms, do we want a separate branch of government to review those 
decisions? If we do, the reduced role of the judiciary is troubling. 
Moreover, the number of cases litigated will plummet. The question in most cases 
will simply be whether or not the citizen complied with the simple directive. The 
case will have two questions: Was the light red? And did the citizen stop? The evi-
dence to answer those questions will continue to be more readily accessible. As the 
number of cases and controversies litigated falls and the interpretation of policy be-
comes unnecessary, a judge’s opportunities to use a case to make policy statements 
and impact opinion will diminish. On the other hand, the judge’s opportunities to 
inject bias and error will also diminish.150 
Things are a little more complicated for questions of constitutional law. In theory 
at least, constitutional standards151 are no different from the standards we have dis-
cussed throughout this Article. A machine could easily be programmed to tell us 
whether a particular search was unreasonable,152 whether certain speech was pornog-
raphy, whether microdirectives are valid under the commerce clause or some other 
provision, and so on. 
There are institutional structures, however, that may appear to be barriers to the 
promulgation of microdirectives for constitutional review. As our regime currently 
stands, neither Congress nor any agency can dictate that a machine algorithm will 
decide the constitutionality of laws. If Congress creates an algorithm that takes into 
account race or results in the prohibition of speech, the courts—and not a machine—
would declare those algorithms unconstitutional.  
As long as Marbury v. Madison153 remains good law, the constitutional decision 
on an algorithm would have to come from the judiciary. But the courts could, of 
course, bless the use of particular types of algorithms going forward, deeming these 
to be constitutionally proper. For example, an exigent search that was conducted pur-
suant to a machine directive could be presumed to be reasonable if the machine used 
a judicially blessed algorithm. This precedential guidance to regulatory agencies154 
could essentially provide the policy objectives that must guide the microdirective 
technology for constitutional review. This delegation would facilitate the promulga-
tion of microdirectives in the constitutional law space. 
Some, of course, may argue that reducing judicial power over policy is a good 
thing. As the democratically elected branches become more powerful, for example, 
fears about overreaching by unelected judges will be dampened.155 Others will 
                                                                                                             
 
 150.  See supra Part II. 
 151.  The U.S. Constitution generally operates through standards. Schauer, supra note 3, at 308. 
 152.  Cf. Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016). 
 153.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 154.  We discuss this type of second-order regulation above. See supra Part I.C.1.  
 155.  See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); see also sources cited supra note 148. 
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disagree.156 For those who advocate the active role of judges, alternative mechanisms 
for that role might be pursued. Perhaps a judiciary that provides advisory opinions 
on legislative and regulatory policy decisions could preserve the judiciary’s oversight 
and influence on society.157   
B. The Development and Substance of Policy Objectives 
In addition to policy decisions moving away from judges, the process by which 
legislatures and regulators make those decisions will change.  
Broader objectives. As we noted above in Part I.D., regulatory agents will be the 
primary force behind the shift to microdirectives. Legislatures may continue to enact 
standards, but they will leave the machine-aided implementation to regulators. Those 
standards may be nothing more than a statement of the policy objective that should 
guide the rule-making machines. Regulators will then translate that broad objective 
into specific sets of rules generated by machines.158  
Additionally, the ability to achieve broad goals through machine-derived micro-
directives will potentially allow legislatures to state their objectives at increasingly 
higher levels of abstract social policy. Rather than concern themselves with details 
of implementation, the legislature will be able to concentrate on the bigger picture. 
For example, instead of worrying about specific speed limits, the legislature will fo-
cus on the purpose of traffic law: does society want laws that reduce accidents, mini-
mize travel time, reduce fuel consumption, or some perfect mix?  
At its extreme, learning algorithms aided by big data could be asked to prescribe 
a vast set of microdirectives covering multiple fields to achieve an even broader so-
cial goal, such as maximizing welfare, minimizing accidental death, minimizing 
wealth inequality, or (more likely) some combination that sets certain acceptable 
thresholds for these and other social values. This becomes possible because lawmak-
ers no longer have to figure out and set out each precise rule and its connection to 
other rules. Instead, machines will work out the millions of connected micro-
directives that achieve a stated slate of policy objectives. This complex catalog of 
microdirectives can be targeted to small instances of behavior that fit within a larger 
web of behavioral actions to achieve a broad goal. 
Faster change. Algorithm-driven laws will automatically and rapidly adapt to the 
circumstances, optimizing according to the objective of the law. But changes to the 
law result in winners and losers.159 Frequent changes to the law may impose addi-
tional risks on individuals and may affect the willingness of individuals to invest in 
                                                                                                             
 
 156.  See sources cited supra note 148. 
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 158.  See Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Regulation by Machine, 18 
J. MACHINE LEARNING & RES. (forthcoming 2017). 
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projects that may be subject to legal uncertainty.160 A smart machine will, however, 
be able to take into account any effects on the values of reliance investments to find 
a global optimum, rather than merely a local optimum.  
Moreover, predictive technology can be used to advise lawmakers on other po-
tential unintended consequences of certain policy objectives. Under today’s system, 
laws frequently have unintended consequences. Laws that change behavior in un-
expected ways that undermine the law’s goal or disrupt some unrelated area of hu-
man behavior in unexpected ways are common.161 
With the current state of technology, it often takes years before the consequences 
of a policy decision are fully understood. But as big data and predictive technology 
improve, lawmakers will be able to more accurately identify these consequences at 
the time when they make the rules.162  
Unintended consequences. The potential for unintended consequences highlights 
an important facet of the death of rules and standards. Those who set the broad poli-
cies in this new world will need to have deep understandings of both social objectives 
and the way that these technologies work. Machine-generated microdirectives can 
only reduce unintended consequences if the machines are programmed to identify 
the types of consequences about which policymakers or society care. The humans 
who instruct machines to create microdirectives must communicate policy objectives 
to the machines in ways that do not distort the message, and they must “ask” the 
machines to provide assessments of the consequences of proposed objectives.  
If lawmakers do not have a deep understanding of policy consequences and pro-
gramming, the machines may distort rather than further law.163 Such concerns ani-
mate many science-fiction movies about the fears of artificial intelligence.164 The 
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See, e.g., NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES, 146–49 (2014). 
 164.  Such dystopian visions of the future are found in many popular books and movies. 
See, e.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT (1950); 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
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1991). See generally Illah Reza Nourbakhsh, The Coming Robot Dystopia: All Too Inhuman, 
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current debate about Google driverless cars highlights these concerns. Many have 
questioned how one should program a self-driving car to deal with ethical decisions 
about the value of life.165 Can Google cars, they ask, deal with ethical questions that 
face human drivers? One commentator notes that humans believe that avoiding a 
collision with a dog is more important than avoiding a collision with animals that are 
not pets (like squirrels).166 But machines—if programmed correctly—could replicate 
that value judgment and, given the advances in predictive technology, would execute 
the judgment with greater accuracy than a human. On the other hand, if the commen-
tator is wrong—and squirrels are to be avoided with the same care as dogs—then the 
program can be changed accordingly.167 The key, then, is in the lawmaker’s ability 
to program that value into the machines.  
Still, some appear to worry that poorly programmed cars will implement a fright-
ening system of social values where they swerve to kill the “wrong” people.168 Im-
plicit in this critique, however, is the false idea that human drivers always swerve to 
kill the “right” people. It would seem that the trick in getting all of this right is not in 
programming the computer, but in somehow agreeing on which people are the 
“right” ones to kill. That is an age-old moral problem to which we still do not have 
an agreed-upon answer. Thus, the so-called “trolley problem”169 is, indeed, a real one 
for self-driving cars. But that is a familiar critique on the limits of human ethics, not 
on the limits of self-driving cars. In other words, it is still a problem for human-
driven cars too. 
                                                                                                             
 
FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2015, at 23. 
 165.  See, e.g., Chris Bryant, Driverless Cars Must Learn To Take Ethical Route, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4ab2cc1e-b752-11e4-981d-00144feab7de 
[https://perma.cc/D6V9-BEFS]; Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Autonomous Cars, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-ethics-of-autonomous 
-cars/280360/ [https://perma.cc/QQ7V-D4C3].  
 166.  A Point of View: The Ethics of the Driverless Car, BBC: MAG. (Jan. 24, 2014), 
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25861214 [https://perma.cc/A847-2JRJ]. 
 167.  Janet D. Stemwedel, Building Self-Driving Cars That Drive Ethically, FORBES (Aug. 
5, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetstemwedel/2015/08/05/building-self 
-driving-cars-that-drive-ethically/ [https://perma.cc/2QRH-3U5B] (noting that Google is con-
sulting with moral philosophers).  
 168.  See Tanay Jaipuria, Self-Driving Cars and the Trolley Problem, HUFFINGTON POST: 
BLOG (June 1, 2015, 12:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tanay-jaipuria/self-driving-cars 
-and-the-trolley-problem_b_7472560.html [https://perma.cc/CP4M-5GC4] (asking whether 
cars can make ethical decisions that must value different lives and whether they should favor 
the life of their owner); Tim Worstall, When Should Your Driverless Car from Google Be 
Allowed To Kill You?, FORBES (June 18, 2014, 8:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/timworstall/2014/06/18/when-should-your-driverless-car-from-google-be-allowed-to-kill-you/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZL3N-4A9H] (same). 
 169.  The trolley problem can take different forms but usually presents the question of what 
one would do if a trolley is on track to kill a group of people and the observer can pull a lever 
that will divert the trolley to a different course that will kill one (different) person, thus saving 
the group. On the trolley problem, see generally, PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and 
the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY (1978); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Comment, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 
1395 (1985). 
1440 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1401 
 
In any event, lawmakers of the future must be able to translate society’s values 
into programmable objectives for the machines. The task of identifying those values, 
it seems to us, will remain a human one.170 
C. Changes to the Practice of Law 
The observations thus far lead naturally to the next related observation: the death 
of rules and standards will fundamentally transform the practice of law. For years, a 
chorus of scholars have been pointing out that technology will disrupt and transform 
the practice of law.171 We join this chorus to note that as lawmakers adopt laws that 
are translated and communicated to citizens as simple microdirectives, the role of 
lawyers will change dramatically. The role of compliance and litigation lawyers will 
diminish, while the role of a lawyer as lobbyist or policy advisor will grow.  
The compliance lawyer today serves as an intermediary who advises a client on 
how best to comply with complex rules or vague standards. Part of the expertise of a 
compliance lawyer is in predicting how an ex post adjudicator will likely apply the 
relevant standard to a certain set of facts.  
Thus, in our tax example, a client might ask a lawyer whether or not her business 
arrangement complies with the standards of the tax code. In our medical example, a 
doctor might ask a lawyer whether her diagnostic procedures would be deemed rea-
sonable under the controlling legal standard. The lawyer reads the relevant law and 
exercises her judgment—based on education, experience, and other expertise—to 
provide a prediction. The lawyer may go beyond a yes or no answer and suggest 
creative ways that a client could alter behavior to increase the likelihood that the 
adjudicator would find the client in compliance.  
Technology will reduce the need for such compliance lawyers. The citizen will 
simply be told directly whether behavior complies with the law or not. There is no 
need to consult a lawyer to ask whether a traffic light is green or red. Similarly, liti-
gators will no longer be in the business of arguing about the application of standards, 
and judges will no longer be in the business of applying them.  
There will be skeptics. As discussed above in Part II, even though technology has 
already displaced many labor markets, there is a common sentiment that many hold 
that their profession is different and somehow immune to technological disrup-
tions.172 But simply noting that a compliance lawyer’s role as information middleman 
will disappear is not to say that the entire profession of law will be automated. Rather, 
there will be a shift in the types of tasks that lawyers are charged with. Lawyers will 
be forced to adapt to the new environment.  
Setting the policy directives of a machine algorithm is complicated. To tell a ma-
chine that its objective is to minimize traffic accidents, without more, would lead to 
                                                                                                             
 
 170.  There is a possibility that machines could simply observe human behavior and from 
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 172.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
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standstill traffic—or, more absurdly, the prohibition of motor vehicles. Instructing 
the machine to minimize travel times could lead to an abundance of car accidents. A 
machine can only write rules to meet the objective as it is presented. As we have 
discussed, the humans who set the objective must be able to understand the conse-
quences of different objectives and must be able to understand which objectives are 
desirable. 
Understanding the implications of different objectives requires not only an under-
standing of the technology, but also a highly interdisciplinary understanding of hu-
man behavior and the goals of our regulatory state. The trend of the last fifty years 
toward interdisciplinary legal education,173 with an emphasis on understanding topics 
such as economics, psychology, philosophy, history, and so on, is one that will serve 
this new role of lawyers well. We note in passing that recent countertrends toward 
so-called practical lawyering174 are likely to be wasteful. The idea of training lawyers 
solely in practical skills provides little benefit when the skills required are likely to 
change rapidly. The understanding of legal policy should remain the focus of the 
legal endeavor because human individuals will set the high-level policy objectives 
for the law.175  
D. The Broader Consequences of These Technologies on Individuals 
The death of rules and standards will raise major concerns about privacy, auton-
omy, and the ethics of human decision making.  
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1442 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1401 
 
1. Privacy 
Most obviously, as with all applications of big data, the use of data gathering to 
predict outcomes raises privacy concerns.176 These concerns have been addressed 
extensively in other contexts.177 In our context, the potential for invasions of privacy 
is high. Government-controlled machines will be gathering data about individual be-
havior and using that information in two ways. First, they will use the information to 
assess an individual’s behavior and provide a legal directive. Second, they will use 
the information as part of its aggregated data that goes into setting the micro-
directives. Stoplight cameras and GPS tracking already create the ability for the gov-
ernment to know a citizen’s comings and goings. These capabilities to invade privacy 
will increase. And the concerns become greater when the government uses the infor-
mation it gathers in conjunction with technology to predict future actions by an 
individual.178 
There is a trade-off here. The more limitations placed on the government’s ability 
to gather information, the weaker will be its ability to create precise micro-
directives.179 Moreover, there may be privacy-based calls for the halting of micro-
directives because the mere prediction based on aggregate data violates principles of 
privacy.  
The debate and policy choices on privacy here are likely to track general debates 
and choices about privacy and big data. One can also expect that as individuals con-
tinue to waive privacy in private-law contexts,180 public law will be given additional 
freedom to gather information that facilitates the evolution of microdirectives. 
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2. Autonomy 
As lawmakers promulgate more precise microdirectives to advance broad policy 
objectives, the scope of law can expand. Take, for example, a broad policy objective 
that seeks to increase productivity. In the hands of a powerful algorithm, micro-
directives aimed at a broad goal like that could dictate virtually every decision in a 
citizen’s life. Smart traffic lights could decide who goes first based on productivity 
levels. Smart restaurants could dictate what a citizen is allowed to eat for breakfast.181 
This presents real concerns for individual autonomy.182  
But these concerns are not direct objections to the use of predictive technology. 
Rather they are objections to reckless lawmaking or to overreaching. Lawmakers 
have to understand what objectives to use in setting microdirectives. Improving 
productivity might be one policy objective, but there may be other constraining ob-
jectives that should be factored in, such as respecting certain spheres of individual 
decision making. If principles of human autonomy require the law to allow humans 
to make certain decisions even when those decisions are inconsistent with other so-
cial values, then the lawmakers must be aware of those principles and avoid en-
croaching on them when they set policy objectives. This reinforces the importance 
of lawyers and lawmakers as interdisciplinary policy experts. 
The well-trained expert lawmaker might still overreach. The technologies we 
have described provide the tools for almost limitless lawmaking. A goal to increase 
productivity at all costs is difficult to enact through legislation today—the infor-
mation costs are too high. But that will not be the case with microdirectives. As the 
information limits on lawmaking fall, it will only be political costs that restrain those 
in power. As in our discussion of the diminished role of judges, this once again coun-
sels in favor of attention to institutional structures. 
A final and perhaps even deeper concern is that lawmakers may turn the micro-
directives into actual physical restraints on action. Rather than tell you that the light 
is red, the technology of the future may simply prevent your car from moving. A self-
driving car with no driver override could be entirely in the control of the lawmaker.183 
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As the Internet of Things continues to expand, this could be true of most daily 
actions.  
From a technological perspective, the move from microdirectives to automatic 
restraint is small. From an ethical and policy perspective, however, it is enormous. 
The benefits of such a move include increased compliance and increased certainty, 
while the costs arrive by way of a large loss of individual autonomy. One might think 
such a rule were appropriate if the restraint kept a gun from firing in a situation that 
would be murder. But things would be different if the rule related to something less 
malicious like parking in an illegal spot outside a hospital in an emergency or some-
thing mundane like crossing a neighborhood street. Our prediction about the death 
of rules and standards does not necessarily imply prior restraint, which is a topic that 
needs to be addressed separately.184  
3. Ethics 
There may be additional concerns that the death of rules and standards will erode 
moral decision making. Some argue that individuals who solely follow rules and di-
rectives will become robotic—mere automatons who fail to appreciate the moral 
choices that should underlie their actions.185 This is a point made by Professor 
Shiffrin.186 Forcing individuals to engage in moral deliberation may be important to 
the moral health of individuals or of a democratic society. If this is true, the death of 
rules and standards will bring with it significant costs. We are skeptical that anyone 
could stop this evolution, so the appropriate response is likely to seek out alternative 
outlets for human moral deliberation and take that into account in the process of 
determining the appropriate boundaries of the law. 
Finally, people are generally uncomfortable with allowing machines to make im-
portant ethical decisions. As discussed above, the debate about Google driverless 
cars demonstrates this.187 In that context, many have already begun to ask whether it 
is acceptable for a machine to make complex ethical decisions about life or death.188 
If we bracket Professor Shiffrin’s concerns about moral atrophy, the source of con-
cern appears to arise from a sense that humans have a unique ability to make ethical 
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decisions.189 It should be noted, however, that even when a machine is making an 
algorithmic calculation these are human decisions. Humans decide which values the 
machine considers. Humans tell it what its objective is.  
But that does not necessarily alleviate the concern. There is perhaps an ethical 
value in having a human making important instant decisions rather than placing our-
selves on a course of action that cannot be reviewed in the actual moment. We sus-
pect that a large part of what is going on here is lingering skepticism about accuracy 
concerns, which we addressed in Part II. People often trust human hunches more than 
complex machine decisions even in the face of evidence that the machines are more 
accurate. Perhaps it is a fear of the unknown. But as we have noted above, there is 
little evidence that humans will be systematically better at making these decisions 
than machines. 
Still a deeper philosophical problem remains. Something that makes us human 
might be lost when lawmakers use machines to make all of our collective value judg-
ments in advance (even if those judgments are accurate).190 This may be at the root 
of the fear with which people view artificial intelligence.  
These are pressing ethical problems that will face lawmakers in the future. The 
current trend is toward microdirectives that reduce in-the-moment ethical decisions. 
To understand whether that is a good thing, lawmakers must engage with philoso-
phers and ethicists on these questions as the evolution to machine-derived micro-
directives progresses.  
*  *  * 
Before concluding, it is worth noting an implicit assumption in our prediction: the 
implications and consequences we discuss here will not themselves prevent the death 
of rules and standards. One might think that if the institutional upheaval and auton-
omy concerns are great enough, lawmakers will reject the move to microdirectives. 
We do not see this happening. The growth of predictive technology is robust. The 
lure of accuracy (“getting things right”) and the regulated actors’ desire for certainty 
are powerful forces that will dominate political and legal debates. The more nuanced 
considerations we discuss in this Part will, we think, be sidelined. 
In that sense, our prediction is about the law’s current course. Those who believe 
the costs of that course are unacceptable should focus on methods of alleviating these 
costs or finding means to intervene and change that evolutionary path. 
CONCLUSION 
As machines become increasingly intelligent, and continue to outperform human 
judgment, the influence of artificial intelligence will spread far and wide. The tech-
nologies we have discussed are already being used by doctors to detect cancers, by 
consumers to optimize their search for products, and by financial advisors to provide 
advice.  
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The legal system will not be immune from this trend. We have suggested through-
out this Article that this technological revolution will dramatically alter the founda-
tional structure of law as we know it. Predictive technology will generate greater ex 
ante information that can be used by lawmakers to write highly specific, complex 
laws. And individuals will receive notice of these complex laws in a simple form 
thanks to technological advances in communication. This will be the death of rules 
and standards and the rise of microdirectives.  
These developments will have profound implications for the role of judges, leg-
islators, regulators, lawyers, and individuals in the legal system. But beyond that, we 
will have to change the way we think and talk about law. Take, for example, the 
classic debate between legal realists and legal formalists.191 Without ex post adjudi-
cation, this debate changes radically. As standards disappear and judges have pro-
gressively less influence, legislative intent will be entrenched and concretized in the 
catalog of microdirectives. 
Technological changes that vastly improve ex ante information will also breathe 
new life into old law-and-economics models that began with an assumption that law-
makers and citizens have full information. Friction in these models caused by imper-
fect and asymmetric information has provided a fertile source of material for critics, 
both inside and outside the field of law and economics. But these models will be 
given renewed importance. Similarly, the public choice literature will have an in-
creased emphasis on how legislators choose objectives, rather than how they imple-
ment laws, while academic interest in subjects such as judicial behavior will 
dissipate. 
All of this is to say that legal institutions of all types will change radically. We 
are witnessing an information revolution. And, like other technological revolutions, 
it will precede a legal revolution. The industrial revolution, for example, saw human 
labor replaced by machine labor and the cost of transportation fell markedly with 
inventions such as the steam engine. It greatly reduced transaction costs and had 
widespread impact on all spheres of law including contract law,192 property law,193 
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employment law,194 criminal law,195 and tort law.196  
The information revolution has already resulted in dramatic changes in the world 
of commerce. For example, companies such as YouTube, Uber, and Airbnb have 
disrupted and uprooted heavily regulated and stable industries. The coming techno-
logical revolution will lead to similar disruption of the legal services industry, but 
the effect on law will be much deeper and far wider. It will affect the very structure 
of legal commands and the way we, as a society, choose to govern the behavior of 
citizens.  
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